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VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO.,
and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation,
Defendants.
Priority No. 16

VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party
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vs.
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah
corporation also known as RICHARDS
IRRIGATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER
RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a
division or agency of the State of
Utah, PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER,
Third-Party
Defendants and
Appellees.

Third D i s t r i c t Court Case
No. C - 8 7 - 2 3 9 0

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A 1 2 ( B ) ( 6 ) DISMISSAL OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE YOUNG

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-(2)(k) (1986 as amended).
ISSUE8 PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the

"Act") bars any of Rock Products' causes of action against the
State Defendants (the Division of Water Resources for the State
of Utah, Peter T. Lin and W. James Palmer):
a.

Whether the 1987 amendments to the Act apply

to this case;
b.

Whether the conduct of the State Defendants

constitutes the performance of a "governmental
function";
c.

Whether immunity from suit is waived because

the conduct of Peter T. Lin ("Lin") and W. James Palmer
("Palmer") did not arise out of the performance of a
discretionary function;
d.

Whether immunity from suit is waived for Rock

Products' breach of contract cause of action;
e.

Whether Lin and/or Palmer may be held

personally liable for causes of action based upon fraud
or malice;

2

f.

Whether Lin and Palmer are subject to suit

under Rock Products' federal civil rights cause of
action;
2.

Whether Rock Products has sufficiently pled causes

of action against the respective State Defendants for:
a.

Fraud;

b.

Negligent Misrepresentations;

c.

Conspiracy;

d.

Breach of Contract;

e.

Failure to Fund;

f.

Interference with Prospective Economic

Relations;
g.

Interference with Present Economic Relations;

h.

Injunctive Relief;

i.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith

and Fair Dealing;
j.

Blacklisting; and

k.

a Civil Rights Violation under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.
8TANDARD OF REVIEW
Several standards of review are pertinent to Rock
Products' appeal:

3

1.

The Utah Court of Appeals (1) must accept all of

the factual allegations of the Complaint as true and consider
them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in a
light most favorable to Rock Products and (2) must reverse the
order of the District Court and deny the Motion to Dismiss unless
it appears to a certainty that Rock Products would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claims.

St. Benedict's

Dev. v. St.

Hospital,

811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Anderson

Reynolds,

Inc.,

J.

& Sons Co.,

Groves

2.

v. Dean

Benedict's
Witter

200 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ut. App. 1992); Heiner

v.

S.

790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990).

The Standard of Review for claims dismissed under

Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is that the Utah
Court of Appeals gives the trial court's ruling no deference and
reviews under a correctness standard.
Benedict's

Hospital,

Craig-Olsen,

Inc.,
3.

St.

Benedict's

8112 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Olsen

Dev.
v.

v.

St.

Park'

815 P.2d 1356 (Ut. App. 1991).

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is generally not final

or with prejudice on the merits; a plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct any technical
defects in the pleading.
(2nd. Cir. 1991).

Branum v. Clark,

See 5A C. Wright

& A. Miller,

and Procedure § 1357 at 360-65 (1990).
4

927 F.2d 698, 704-6
Federal Practice

4.

The Court should examine the Third-Party Complaint

to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any
possible theory.

Bowers v. Hardwick,

487 U.S. 186, 202, 92

L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2849 (1986).
5.

The Utah Court of Appeals should be reluctant to

dismiss under 12(b)(6) when an asserted theory is a novel theory.
Electrical

Constr.

& Maint.

Co.,

Inc.

v. Maeda Pac. Corp.,

F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1985).

[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

5
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The constitutional and statutory provisions governing
this appeal are the following:
1.

The United States Constitution, Fourteenth

Amendment (attached hereto as part of Addendum "C");
2.

The Utah Constitution, Article XII, § 19 (attached

as Addendum "D");
3.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (attached as Addendum "E");

4.

Several sections of the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, U.C.A. §§ 63-30-3, 4(4), 5, 10, and 11(1) (attached as
Addendum "F");
5.

U.C.A. §§ 68-3-3 and 4 (attached as Addendum "G") ;

6.

U.C.A. §§ 34-24-1 and 2 (attached as Addendum

"H") .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This cases arises out of the installation by Ves A.
Karren dba Rock Products ("Rock Products") of a pressurized water
irrigation system currently utilized for The Richards Irrigation
Company ("Richards") in Salt Lake County.

Under its written

contract with Richards ("State Contract") the Division of Water
Resources for the State of Utah (the "Division") undertook
responsibility (i) to finance 85% of the costs of the system,
6

(ii), to design and layout the system and provide other
engineering services, (iii) to prepare specifications, plans, and
bidding documents for contractors, and (iv) to supervise
construction of the system.

Rock Products asserts that it was an

intended third-party beneficiary under the State Contract, that
it was acting as the agent of Richards, and that duties arose to
it because of such undertakings.
Rock Products was not fully paid for the installation
of the system and seeks additional funds from the Division as a
result.

The Third-Party Complaint also asserts claims against

the Division and Lin, an employee of the Division, for inducing
Rock Products to install materials for which Lin and the Division
had no intention of paying and for negligently representing said
conditions.

Another employee of the Division, Palmer, is also

sued for "blacklisting" Rock Products from bidding upon or
participating in Utah State Contracts in order to coerce Rock
Products into settling cost amounts with Richards for which the
Division would ultimately be partially liable under the State
Contract.
Course of Proceedings.
Rock Products filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint
("Complaint"),

asserting the following Causes of Action against

7

the Division, Lin and Palmer (collectively, the "State
Defendants11) :
1.

Against the Division for breach of contract for

failure to properly investigate and to represent to Rock Products
the soil conditions of the system.
2.

Against the Division for failure to fully meet its

funding obligations for the system.
3.
conditions.

(Fifth Cause of Action)

(Sixth Cause of Action)

Against Lin for negligent misrepresentation of soil
^Third Cause of Action)

4. Against Palmer and the Division for tortious
interference with existing and prospective economic relations.
(Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action)
5. For injunctive relief against the Division and
Palmer. (Eleventh Cause of Action)
6. Against the Division for breach of good faith duty.
(Twelfth Cause of Action).
7. Against the Division and Palmer for violation of
State constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 12, Section
19 of the Utah Constitution.

(Thirteenth Cause of Action)

8. Against Lin and Palmer for violation of
constitutionally protected rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
("§ 1983").

(Fifteenth Cause of Action).

8

The State Defendants brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss all causes of action against them.

No affidavits or

evidence was presented.
Disposition by the Trial Court.
The Court, without taking evidence of any kind,
dismissed with prejudice all of the foregoing Causes of Action on
the following grounds:
1.

The Complaint "fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted against the State Defendants."
2.

The Act "bars every aspect" of Rock Products7

Complaint against the State Defendants.
3.

"Rock Products has no contract with the State and

is not the intended beneficiary of the State Contract".
4.

"Rock Products' tort claims do not state a cause

of action, and are also barred by immunity."
5.

"Rock Products' constitutional and statutory and

civil rights claims failed because of sovereign immunity; and
because Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because,
upon the alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under
the State or Federal statutes or The Utah Constitution or The
United States Constitution."

9

6.

"As to the Fifteenth Cause of Action, (§ 1983

Claim), Rock Products has failed to comply with the notice
requirements of § 63-30-11 and 12."
The Court also stated that Rock Products had failed to
comply with the undertaking requirements of § 63-30-19, but from
the statements by the Court at the hearing and from, the language
of the Order, itself, the Court did not base its ruling on this
issue. The Court specifically states that the Complaint "is
dismissed with prejudice, for the reasons set forth m

paragraphs

1-6."
RELEVANT FACTS
Inasmuch as the Court dismissed the allegations against
the State Defendants with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) without
taking any evidence by affidavit or otherwise, the pertinent
document before the Court is the Complaint.
attached as Addendum "A"; R. 485-525.J1

(The Complaint is

Rather than restate all

of the allegations of the, Rock Products hereby summaries and
highlights the following aspects of those allegations:
1.

The Division agreed with Richards, among other

things, (i) to finance 85% of the costs of the system, (ii), to
design and layout the system and to provide other engineering

±,f

R. 485-525" refers the Court to pages 485-525 of the Record
on Appeal.
10

services, (iii) to prepare specifications, plans, and bidding
documents for contractors, and (iv) to supervise construction of
the system. (Complaint, f 11; R. 491-492,)
2.

In so acting, the Division became and acted in the

capacity of the agent and duly authorized representative of
Richards, and Rock Products was an intended third-party
beneficiary under the Division Contract.

(Complaint, JJ 11, 18,

& 58; R. 492, 494-95, 507.)
3.

The Division in fact undertook to perform the

activities described above prepared, although that performance
was incomplete and often flawed. (Complaint, f5 14, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 32, 33, 35, 45, 55, 58, and 59; R. 493 495-96, 496,
498-500, 503, 505-508.)
4.

The Division breached its obligations to Rock

Products by failing to properly carry out its obligations
regarding investigation, layout, supervision of construction, and
representations under the Contract, (Complaint, ff 58 and 59; R.
507-508) and failed to pay all of the funds to which Rock
Products was entitled from the Division.

(Complaint, 5 62;

R. 509.)
5.

Lin, in conjunction with Widerberg and as the

Division engineer on site, entered into a scheme to defraud Rock
Products by inducing Rock Products to install sand and then not
11

pay for the same.
500-502.)

(Complaint, ff 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37; R.

Lin also misrepresented soil conditions of the

properties at the pre-bid conference giving rise to causes of
action for negligent misrepresentation.

(Complaint, JJ 45-50,

R. 503-505.)
6.

Palmer and the Division interfered with present

and prospective economic relations by refusing to permit Rock
Products to participate in and bid upon State contracts and
removing it from the "pre-qualified potential contractor list" as
a means of coercing Rock Products to settle its differences with
Richards. (Complaint, ffl 64-68, 70-75, 77-84, and 86; R. 509-512,
513-515.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rock Products hereby presents the following Summary of
Argument:
1.

The Court erred in concluding that the Act bars

every aspect of Rock Products' Complaint against the State
Defendants for the following reasons:
a.

The Act does not apply to the allegations and

conduct of the State Defendants in this case because the
State Defendants were not involved in a governmental
function;

12

b.

Even if they were involved in a governmental

function, the State Defendants were performing "ministerial"
rather than "discretionary" functions;
c.

The Act does not bar contract claims; and

d.

The Act does not bar Constitutional or § 198 3

claims.
2.

The Court erred in determining that the Complaint

did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
the State Defendants because the necessary elements for breach of
contract, fraud, § 1983, and Constitutional claims were properly
plead under the "notice pleading" standards of this jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals should be reluctant to dismiss under
12(b)(6) when a novel theory is asserted as with the Utah
Constitutional claims.

Even were this not the case, dismissal of

the case "with prejudice" was improper, and, at the least, Rock
Products should be given the opportunity to correct any technical
deficiencies if they exist.
3.

The Court erred in concluding that Rock Products

must comply with the Act's notice requirements as a pre-requisite
to bringing an action under § 1983.
4.

The Court erred in ruling, without taking any

evidence, that Rock Products was not an intended third-party

13

beneficiary of the State Contract and had no other contractual
duties to Rock Products.
5.

The Court erred in stating that Rock Products could

"not plead" any constitutional or § 1983 cause of action.
POINT I
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT BAR ANY OF ROCK
PRODUCT'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS
A.

The 1987 Amendments to the Governmental Immunity
Act Have No Application to this Case.

The State Defendants alleged in their Motion to Dismiss
that they are immune in this case from suit based, in part, on
the amendments to the Act enacted by the 1987 General Session of
the Legislature.

(R. 829-831.)

Those amendments (the

"Amendments") became effective April 27, 1987 and broadened the
definition for what constitutes a "governmental function"; the
Amendments contain no statement that they are to be retroactive.
Because the 1987 amendments have no application to this case, the
immunity arguments of the State Defendants are without merit.
According to the Act, "[a] claim arises when the
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against
a private person begins to run."

U.C.A. § 63-30-11(1).

Utah law

is that a cause of action generally accrues when "the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action" happens.
McDonald,

635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
14

Myers

v.

The Utah Supreme Court

has applied the same rule in cases where the claims are against
See

governmental entities.

e.g.,

Warren

Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1992).

v.

Provo

City

Corp.,

196

Since all of the acts

complained of in this case occurred prior to 1987, Rock Products'
claims all arose prior to the April 1987 effective date of the
1987 Amendments.
The Utah Supreme Court has generally declined to
retroactively apply amendments to the Act.

In refusing to apply

1984 amendments to the Act, the Utah Supreme Court followed the
statutory mandate that

lf

[n]o part of these revised statutes is

retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
Stores

v.

Salt

Lake

City

Corp.,

citing U.C.A. § 68-3-3 (1953).

Rocky Mt.

Thrift

784 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1989),

As applied to the Act, that court

further explained, "If the 1984 amendment provides defendant with
any greater degree of immunity . . . than that previously
provided . . . it is a substantive change from the law . . . and
cannot be applied retroactively."
original);

Accord,

Irvine

v.

Salt

Id.
Lake

at 462 (emphasis in
County,

785 P.2d 411,

412-13 (Utah 1989).
The Rocky

Mt.

Thrift

and Irvine

decisions are

dispositive of the retroactivity question here.

Even the State

Defendants admit that the Amendments to the Act broaden the scope
of governmental immunity by clarifying and broadening the meaning
15

of "governmental function.11

(R. 830.)

Accordingly, the 1987

amendments have altered the substantive law in effect when the
parties engaged in the relevant activities.

To now apply the

Amendments retroactively would deprive Rock Products of causes of
action that clearly existed at the time Rock Products performed
work on the system.

Therefore, the Amendments clearly do not

apply to this case.
B.

Application of Utah's Pre-1987 Governmental
Immunity Act to the Case at Bar.

Utah law relevant to determining whether governmental
immunity exists in this case derives from the pre-1987 Act as it
has been interrupted by the Utah Supreme Court in Standiford
Salt

Lake City

v. Salt

Corp.,

Lake City

605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), and in

Corp.,

v.

Johnson

629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981) (defining

"governmental function"); Andrus

v. State,

541 P.2d 1117 (Utah

1975) (discussing distinction between ministerial and
discretionary actions); Dalton

Dist.,

v.

Salt

Lake

Suburban

Sanitary

676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) (holding the Act does not apply

to nongovernmental functions); Doe v. Arguelles,

716 P.2d 279

(Utah 1985) (discretionary vs. ministerial); and other cases.
The Act affords governmental immunity for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
subject to various express statutory waivers.

Because the pre-

1987 Act did not define "governmental function," the Utah Supreme
16

Court supplied such a definition.
City

Corp.,

In Standiford

v. Salt

Lake

605 P. 2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated

that, in order for the activities of a governmental entity to
comprise a "governmental function," such activity must be "of
such unique nature that it can only be performed by governmental
agency or . . . is essential to the core of governmental
activity."
Johnson

Id.

case

at 1236-1237.

Commenting on the addition of the

analysis to the Standiford

Court noted that the test

test, the Utah Supreme

lf/

does not refer to what government may

do, but to what government alone must do7 and includes
'activities not unique in themselves . . . but essential to the
performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental'."
Rocky Mt. Thrift

Stores

v. Salt

462 (Utah 1989) quoting Johnson

Lake City

Corp.,

784 P.2d 459,

at 434 (emphasis in original).

Applying the Standi ford/Johnson

test, the Utah Supreme

Court has held many activities carried out by governmental
entities to not be afforded immunity under the Act. See, e.g.
Dalton,

supra,

(the operation of a sewer system is not a

governmental function), and Thomas v. Clearfield

City,

642 P.2d

737 (Utah 1982) (the collection and disposal of sewage are not
governmental functions).
The Act, as applied in this case, operates as follows:

17

(1)

The Act does not afford immunity for any action

undertaken by a governmental entity which is not a
"governmental function" under the

Standiford/Johnson

test;
(2)

When immunity is not afforded as set forth above,

no provision of the Act applies, Dalton,

supra.,

at

400;
(3)

The Act specifically provides (and still does,

even after the Amendments) for waiver of governmental
immunity in certain situations.

See, e.g.,

§ 63-30-5,

§ 63-30-10.
The right to maintain an action, then, against a governmental
entity could result from a finding that the alleged injury either
did not result from the exercise of a governmental function, or,
even though the injury resulted from the exercise of a
governmental function, the government's immunity had been
expressly waived.

However, Rock Products asserts that there is

no need for this Court to decide more than that the State
Defendants' acts and decisions do not amount to governmental
functions.

18

C.

Activities of the Division's Personnel Do Not
Constitute a Governmental Function.

The alleged activities of the State Defendants do not
meet the Standi ford/Johnson

"governmental functions" test, A

brief review of a series of Utah Supreme Court cases readily
demonstrates this.
In Dalton

v. Salt

Lake Suburban

Sanitary

Dist.,

676

P.2d 399 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that the
operation of a sewer system by a sanitary district was not a
governmental function since the operation of the sewer system was
deemed not to be so unique that it could only be performed by a
governmental agency or was essential to the core of governmental
activity.
case.

Dalton

resolves the immunity issue in the present

The construction, funding and development of projects like

the Richards project is not such a unique function that it could
not be performed by some construction or banking entity outside
of the realm of government.
This is further supported by the case of Thomas
Clearfield
City

City,

642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).

Thomas v.

v.

Clearfield

determined that the maintenance of a city sewer system is

not essential to the core of governmental activity.

The Court

reasoned that private concerns often maintain their own sewage
systems and that the maintenance of a sewage system was not
uniquely governmental or essential to the core of its activity.
19

By the same reasoning, the funding, construction and sale of the
water system is not uniquely governmental or essential to the
core of governmental activity.
In addition, the violation of Utah Constitutional
provisions (as alleged with respect to Palmer) and conspiracy to
defraud (as alleged with respect to Lin) do not constitute
governmental functions and are not essential to the core of
governmental activity.
D•

Even if the Activities of the State Defendants
Constituted a Governmental Function, Immunity
Under the Act is Waived.

1.

Activities of the State Defendants are ministerial
and not discretionary•

Even when a governmental function is involved, if the
activities undertaken by the governmental entity are ministerial
rather than discretionary, immunity is waived•
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1) (a).

The Utah Supreme Court has established

a four-part test to measure whether the acts and decisions of
government are purely discretionary.

The test is:

(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective?
20

(3) Does the act, omission, or decision
require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged act, omission, or
decision?
Little

v. Utah State

Div.

of Family

Servs.,

667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah

1983) .
Construing Little
Court, in Doe v. Arguelles,

and other cases, the Utah Supreme
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), held that,

when a governmental employee performs a ministerial as opposed to
a discretionary function, the individual is liable for his
tortuous conduct.

In Arguelles,

the Court stated that

"operational, routine everyday matters not requiring evaluation
of broad policy factors and which only implement established
policy are non-discretionary ministerial functions." Arguelles,
supra,

at 282-83. The Court ruled that a decision or action

implementing a pre-existing policy is operational in nature and
is undeserving of protection under the discretionary function
exception to personal liability.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Andrus

v. State,

541 P.2d

117 (Utah 1975), allowed an action against the State Highway
Department where the Highway Department negligently constructed
and designed of a highway project.
21

The Court concluded that,

while the Highway Department acted in a "discretionary function"
in deciding to build the highway and specifying its general
location, the preparation of plans and specification and
supervision of the work was not the performance of a
discretionary function; rather it was the exercise of
"ministerial duties" which thereby denied immunity to the Highway
Department.
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the
Division's selection of which water construction and preservation
projects to fund and plan constituted a discretionary function,
once all policy level decisions had been made, the supervised
construction of its system was ministerial.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Division is
mistaken in contending that Lin and Palmer cannot be sued in
their individual and representative capacities.

An individual

defendant employed by a governmental entity is not immune from
liability for his own tortuous behavior, unless the governmental
agent was performing a "discretionary function."
State,

613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), Schmitt

v. Billings,

See Frank

v.

600 P.2d

516 (Utah 1979).
Furthermore, § 63-30-4(4) of the Act, provides that,
even if the governmental employee was acting within the realm of
discretionary function, that employee may be liable if the
22

employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.

It is

only the governmental entity (the Division) that is immune from
the negligent or intentional misrepresentations committed by
employees within the scope of employment.

U.C.A. § 63-30-

10(1)(f) (1985).
When Section 63-30-4(4) and Arguelles

are viewed

together, a two-part basis exists for finding that Lin and Palmer
are personally liable to Rock Products, and why the Division is
liable for the manner in which Lin and Palmer interfered with
Rock Products' prospective economic relations.

First, Palmer was

performing only non-discretionary "operational routine everyday
matters" in determining that Rock Products would not be allowed
to bid on state-funded water projects, which implicates the
Division.

Second, Palmer acted with "fraud or malice," thereby

rendering him liable in his personal capacity under § 63-30-4(4)
since he had no legitimate basis for blackballing Rock Products.
The same analysis applies to Lin when he acted with fraud or
malice in entering into his conspiracy to defraud.
Bonding;
The failure to file a cost bond undertaking was not a
basis for the district court's dismissal of any of Rock Products7
claims.

The court's Order states:

"Rock Product's Amended

Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, for the
23

reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6 [of this Order].11
Court's Order attached as Addendum

lf lf

B ; R. 1775.)

(See the

Only in

paragraph seven of the Order does the Court mention the
undertaking issue, and the court took no action based upon that
issue.

Id.

In addition, the court stated at oral argument that

it was not persuaded by the state's contention on the undertaking
issue and that the failure to obtain a bond was not a significant
oversight. (R. 2609).

(Rock Products did file a $300.00 bond

with the Court on January 21, 1988, prior to the hearing on the
Division's Motion.)

Consequently, it is assumed that this Court

need not address the undertaking issue as a basis for dismissal
of Rock Products causes of action.
Even were this not the case, the Utah Supreme Court has
ruled that "failure to pay the undertaking is an affirmative
defense not properly raised in a rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss . . . "

Hansen v. Salt

Lake County,

794 P.2d 838 (Utah

1990) . In addition the actions undertaken by the State
Defendants do not comprise "governmental functions," and,
therefore, none of the provisions of the Act apply.
supra,

See

Dalton,

for example, when the Utah Supreme Court held that because

the operation of a sewer system is not a governmental function
under the Standi ford/Johnson

test, the one-year statute of

limitations provided for in § 63-3 0-15 of the Act had absolutely
24

no application to a negligence action brought against a
governmental entity.
S 1983 Notice:
The notice provisions of the Act do not apply in this
case because no governmental function is included.

Even if a

governmental function were involved, Rock Products' claim for
relief under § 1983 derives from legislation passed by the United
States Congress. As such, Rock Products' § 1983 claim can in no
way be impaired or qualified by any state statute; such a statute
would be unconstitutional under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution.
2.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Expressly
Waives Sovereign Immunity With Respect to Rock
Products' Contract Cause of Action.

Section 63-30-5 of the Act provides that "immunity from
suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation".

Therefore, Rock Products' contractual claims are

not barred by the Act.
POINT II
A PLEADER IS REQUIRED ONLY TO MAKE A SHORT
STATEMENT OP ITS CLAIM
In order to render a decision on a Motion to Dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), consideration must initially be given to
Rules 8(a), 8(e) and 8(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Rule 8(a) sets out what a Complaint must contain in
order to state a claim for relief:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment . .
Rule 8(e)(1) provides that no technical forms of
pleading are required; and Rule 8(f) requires that all pleading
be construed to do substantial justice.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Burr

v.

Child,

2 65 P.2d 383,

387 (Utah 1953), clearly indicated how these rules were to
interpreted when it stated that:
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for
the most part taken from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a pleader is required only
to make a short and plain statement of its
claim, U.R.C.P., Rule 8(a), and the
requirement of technical exactness is
excluded. Fine detail is not required.
Porter v. Shoemaker, D . C , 6 F.R.D. 438, 10
Fed. Rule Service, 8(a) Point 25, p. 51. In
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 Supreme
Ct. 385, 38, 91 Lawyers Ed. 2d 451, Mr.
Justice Murphey, discussing the federal
rules, said:
. . . the new rules . . . restrict the
pleading to the task of general noticegiving . . .
All that is required by Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
that the pleading give fair notice of the nature and basis of the
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
26

involved.

See, Blackham

453, 455 (Utah 1955).

v. Snelgrove,

3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d

Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed in

determining the sufficiency of a Complaint.

See, Gill

v.

Timm,

720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986).
The policies underpinning Utah's pleading rules were
further explicated in Williams

v.

State

Farm Ins.

Co.,

656 P.2d

966, 971 (Utah 1982):
It is evident from these statements that the
fundamental purpose of our liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties "the
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
intentions they have pertaining to their
dispute," Cheney v. Ruckner, supra, subject
only to the requirement that their adversary
have "fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the types of litigation involved."
Blackham v. Snelgrove, supra. The functions
of issue formulation and fact revelation are
appropriately left to the deposition
discovery process. The rule "allows
examination into the settlement of all issues
bearing upon the controversy," Cheney v.
Ruckner, supra, with latitude for proof that
extends beyond the pleading, where
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears
from the decisions that these principles are
applied with great liberality in sustaining
the sufficiency of allegations stating a
cause of action or an affirmative defense.
[Emphasis added.]
In light of the aforementioned principles, the Utah
Court has stated that no motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
shall be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the
pleading party would be entitled to no relief under any state of
27

Blackham

facts which could be proved in support of the claim.

Snelgrove,
Inc.,

supra,

Christensen

v. Automatic

467 P.2d 605, 607-608 (Utah 1970).

Transmission

v.

Serv.,

Further, "on Motion to

Dismiss a Complaint, the complainant is entitled to the benefit
not only of the facts stated in the Complaint, but also of the
legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom."

Ellis

Serv.

For purposes of

Dept.,

Etc.,

615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).

v.

Social

the Rule 12(b)(6), the pleading must be construed in the light
most favorable to the pleading party, and the allegations
contained in the pleading are taken as true.
FED. PRACTICE

5 WRIGHT & MILLER,

& PROCEDURE, § 1357, at 594 (1969).

Under the foregoing standards regarding notice-pleading
and the sufficiency of a Complaint in the face of a 12(b)(6)
motion, Rock Products respectfully submits that its amended
Complaint against the State Defendants is more than adequately
pled to state claims for which Rock Products should be
compensated.
POINT III
ROCK PRODUCTS7 COMPLAINT STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OWED ROCK PRODUCTS
In order to determine whether a third party is a
beneficiary under a contract, "the intent of the parties to the
contract as evidenced by the contract itself and surrounding
facts and circumstances" must be examined.
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Wasatch

Bank of

Pleasant

Grove

v.

(Utah 1985); Tracy

Surety
Collins

Ins.

Co. of

Bank

Cal.,

& Trust

1314, 1315 (Utah 1982); Mel Trimble

626 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981).

307 P.2d 298, 300

v.

Real

Dickamore,

Estate

652 P.2d

v.

Fitzgerald,

In this case, the Court took no

evidence whatsoever in the form of affidavits or otherwise to
reach its ruling.

Since the allegations of the Complaint must be

considered as true, the Court's attempt to look beyond the
pleadings, particularly without taking evidence, was improper.
The Supreme Court in the case of Schwinghammer
Alexander,

v.

446 P.2d 414, also recognized the third party

beneficiary theory and classified third-party beneficiaries as
falling into two categories: i) donee beneficiaries, and
ii) creditor beneficiaries.

With respect to creditor

beneficiaries, the Court stated:
If, on the other hand, the promisee's
expressed intent is that some third party
shall receive the performance and
satisfaction and discharge of some actual or
supposed duty or liability of the promisee,
the third party is a creditor beneficiary.
Id. at 415.
While the facts in the Schwinghammer

case are radically

different from those in the instant case, a Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals case, using the same reasoning, concluded that a
factual pattern similar to that alleged in this case created a
third-party creditor beneficiary status.
29

In Hamill

v.

Maryland

Cas.

Co.,

209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954), Hamill agreed to advance

ten percent of any contracts awarded Gunnell Construction and
approved by Hamill in consideration of ten percent of the net
profits realized on any such contract•

The Maryland Casualty

Co., who provided Gunnell with a performance bond for a school
construction project, successfully sought to recover money paid
under the bond on the theory of third-party beneficiary to the
Hamill-Gunnell contract.

The Tenth Circuit Court stated:

The intent to benefit the third person is
generally said to be controlling, and it is
to be gathered from a construction of the
contract in light of the surrounding
circumstances. Id. at 34 0.
In Hamill,

the Court concluded that such funding

arrangements could form the basis of a third-party beneficiary
claim and that the contract should be analyzed in relation to the
surrounding circumstances.

The Court concluded that Maryland

Casualty was an intended third-party creditor beneficiary of the
Hamill-Gunnell financing contract and reasoned as follows:
If Maryland had furnished labor and materials
on the project, Hamill would have undoubtedly
been obligated to the extent of 10 percent of
the contract price to Maryland and all others
similarly situated. We think the liability
is not different where Maryland furnished a
bond to guarantee payment of the bills and
did pay them in performance thereof.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 341.
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The ruling by the Court in this case was improper
because (i) the allegations of Complaint regarding intended
third-party beneficiary for purposes of this Motion must be
considered as true, and (ii) the Court could not, in any event,
make determinations regarding intent from circumstances outside
the Complaint without hearing evidence, which it did not.
Rock Products also alleges that the State Defendants
were acting as the agents and duly authorized representatives of
Richards in dealing with Rock Products.

The State Defendants

therefore became active participants in the Richards contract.
Thus, contractual duties and obligations existed on their part to
Rock Products under the Richards contract as well.
POINT IV
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS
FOR BREACH OP DUTY OP GOOD FAITH, FRAUD, AND
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Breach of Good Faith Duty.

Rock Products has

sufficiently pled a cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

In Beck v. Farmers

the

Utah Supreme Court has further defined the good faith covenant
obligation in St.

Benedicts

Dev. Co. v. St.

P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991).

Benedicts

Hosp.,

In that case, the court

explained,
under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, each party impliedly promises that
31

811

he will not intentionally or purposely do
anything which will destroy or injure the
other party's right to receive the fruits of
the contract. . . . To comply with his
obligation to perform a contract in good
faith, a party's actions must be consistent
with the agreed common purpose and the
justified expectations of the other party.
. . The purpose, intentions, and expectations
of the parties should be determined by
considering the contract language and the
course of dealincfs between and conduct of the
parties.
Id.

at 199-200 (emphasis in original).
Consequently, in Beck

v.

Farmers

Ins.

Exch.,

701 P.2d

795 (Utah 1985) , the Court allowed an action for breach
of implied contractual duty of good faith, stating that the
parties to a contract have "parallel obligations to perform the
contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every
contractual relationship."
also Resource

Mgmt.

Co.

1028, 1037 (Utah 1985).

v.

(Emphasis added.)
Weston

Ranch

Id.

& Livestock

at 801; see
Co.,

706 P.2d

Therefore, Rock Products has

appropriately pled a breach by the Division of its contractual
duty of good faith.

The question of whether the Division

breached this duty is a question to be determined by the trier of
fact and is irrelevant to a 12(b)(6) motion.
Fraud:
Rock Products' cause of action for fraud against Lin
contains all of the nine necessary elements required for this
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cause of action1952); Condor

App. 1987).

v.

Pace v. Parrish,
A.L.

Williams

247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah

& Assoc,

739 P.2d 634-637 (Utah

The allegations in the Complaint state (1) that a

representation was made pursuant to a mutual agreement between
Lin and Widerberg; (2) concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of
its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.

(R. 500-501.)

Rock Products' only burden to meet these elements is
that the cause of action be pled with the necessary specificity
as provided in Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Division did not challenge the specificity of
the pleading and the Court made no ruling that the Complaint
lacked specificity.

The Division's argument that certain fraud

elements are deficient is not a question of law (see R. 842-844,
857-859, 1045.)2

Certainly reasonable reliance is usually a

2

The elements alleged to be deficient, (1) whether the
representation is material; (2) whether Rock had a "right to rely,"
(3) whether the purpose of the representation was to induce Rock
Products to act; and (4) whether Rock Products' reliance was
reasonable are all questions of fact, not law. See Weigand v.
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question of fact for the jury to determine, Condor at 638,
Berkeley

Bank

for

Coops,

v.

Meibos,

citing

607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah

1980), as are other elements of a fraud cause of action. See,
Pitman

v.

Larsen

Distrib.

Co.,

724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. App. 1986)

(inducement to act is a question of fact); Varady

v. White,

595

P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1979) (misrepresentation and reliance are
questions of fact); Pape v. Knoll,

687 P.2d 1087, review

denied,

690 P.2d 506 (Ore. App. 1984) (whether the misrepresentations
were material is a question of fact).

Also, whether the fraud in

fact occurred before the signing of a contract or during the
performance of a contract is irrelevant as to whether a cause of
action for fraud exists.
Negligent Misrepresentation:
Negligent misrepresentation occurs
where one having a pecuniary interest in a
transaction, is in the superior position to
know material facts, and carelessly or
negligently makes a false representation
concerning them, expecting the other party to
rely and act thereon, and the other party
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that
transaction . . . .ff
Culp

Constr.

1990), citing,

(Utah 1967).

Co.

v.

Buildmart

Jardine

v.

Mall,

Brunswick

795 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah
Corp.,

423 P.2d 659, 662

In cases where privity of contract exists, the duty

Union Nat. Bank of Wichita,
610 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1980) (the existence
of fraud is a question of fact).
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to ensure the accuracy and validity of statements nearly always
exists.

Christenson

v. Commonwealth Land Title

P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983).

Ins.

Co.,

666

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court

stated, "we recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a
breach of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are
independent of the contract and may give rise to causes of action
and tort."
1985).

Beck v. Farmers

Ins.

Exch.,

701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah

See, Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 552.
Rock Products' Complaint clearly states (i) that Lin

knew or should have known that the soil conditions of the
properties were not as represented in the pre-bid conference, in
the preconstruction conference, and in the specifications,
(ii) that he was negligent in misrepresenting the same (R.
503-505), (iii) that Rock Products relied upon such
representations in entering into and performing work under the
Richards Contract, (iv) that, as a result, Rock Products has
incurred costs of approximately $116,000.00 that were not
anticipated under the original bid, and (v) that Rock Products is
entitled to repayment for the same.

Id.

The Complaint therefore

properly states a cause of action in this regard.
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POINT V
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS
FOR TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH ROCK PRODUCTS'
PROSPECTIVE AND PRESENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
Contrary to the Division's position, the tort of
interference with prospective economic relations "protects a
party's interest in prospective relationships of economic
advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract (and perhaps not
expected to be)." Leigh
(Utah 1982).

Furniture

v. Isom,

657 P.2d 293, 302

Under this cause of action, the plaintiff must

prove: "(1) that the defendant potentially interfered with the
plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an
improper purpose or by an improper means, (3) causing injury to
plaintiff." Id.
Mountain

State

at 304.
Tel.

& Tel.

See also,
Co.,

Atkin,

Wright

& Mills

v.

709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985).

The

improper purpose test can be satisfied by showing the defendants'
"predominant purpose" is to harm the plaintiff rather than to
advantage the defendant.

Leigh

Furniture,

supra

at 307-08.

If

the defendant interferes with the contract or with the contract
rights for an unlawful purpose, he is not protected.
Federated

Milk

Producers,

Gammon v.

14 U.2d 291, 295-296, 383 P.2d 402, 406

(Utah 1963) (unlawful price fixing).
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A Utah jury can find the tort of interference with
prospective business relations to be made where the evidence
supports a finding either that the defendant intentionally
interfered with the plaintiff's business relations by using an
improper purpose for so doing or by using improper means for so
doing.

In the instant case, the facts can satisfy either basis

for concluding that Palmer and the Division have tortuously
interfered with Rock Products' prospective business relations.
Rock Products' central contention is that Palmer attempted to
improperly force Rock Products into a settlement with Richards by
precluding Rock Products from engaging in any construction on
Division-funded water projects.

This would fit within the

improper means standard since nowhere within the definition of
powers and authorities under the Water and Irrigation Act, 7 310-1 et seq.

or elsewhere is the Division authorized to use such

coercive tactics against a contractor.

A jury may also be able

to reasonably conclude that the Division acted out of an improper
purpose in that its predominant purpose was to force resolution
of a private dispute which is outside its legitimate scope of
activity or to ruin Rock Products' business merely for the sake
of injury alone.

Such a finding would be justified since the

Division was able to readily ascertain that the vast majority of
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Rock Products' work last year came from employment on Divisionfunded projects.
Even if Rock Products were precluded from bringing a
suit for damages because the Division and Palmer are shielded by
the Act, Rock Products could still bring an action in equity
seeking injunctive relief from the Court to stop the Division and
Palmer from "blacklisting" Rock Products.

It is well settled

that governmental immunity is not a defense to an equitable claim
in this state.

Bowles

1345 (Utah 1982).

v. State

ex rel.

Dept.

of Trans.,

652 P.2d

Where Rock Products attempts merely to enjoin

the wrongful action on the part of the governmental agency, that
action is essentially one in equity.
It should be noted that Palmer's wrongdoings, even if
intentional, can give rise to liability to the Division.

Where

Palmer was acting within the scope of his employment (and that is
a factual determination), the Division is liable for his actions,
see Birkner

v. Salt

Lake County,

111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), and

where the Division ratifies his actions by failing to repudiate
them (also a factual determination), the Division is similarly
liable.

Zions

1090 (1988).

First

Nat'l

Bank v. Clark

Clinic

Corp.,

762 P.2d

As the employees, agents and authorized

representatives of the Division, performing ministerial rather
than governmental functions (R. 491) and acting on behalf of the
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Division (K, 515) as alleged in The Complaint , i,ne di'iiuiu. m
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First

Security

Bank

,

bright,

met the requisite showing that the defendant had jeted
J

" The five elements are: (l ) at the time of the defendant's
a; : 'ts the plaintiff was a party to a valid contract with a third
par ty ; (2) t h e defendant either knew or should have known of the
existence of that contract; (3) t h e acts of t h e defendant in
ii iducing the third party t o breach the contract with the plaintiff
were intentional; (4) t h e third party w a s induced *-* breach the
contract with t h e plaintiff as a proximate : • * . - 'f "he
defendant's a c t s ; a n d (5) plaintiff suffered d^- .
* >rt
approximate result of t h e defendant's conduct.

maliciously; however, the plaintiff was not able to show damage
in that case.
damage.

Rock Products has alleged both maliciousness and

The conspiracy to defraud Rock Products with respect to

the sand as alleged against Lin, and the blacklisting by Palmer
with regard to the Hadfield contract, certainly indicate malice,
and Rock Products was substantially damaged as a retsult.
Therefore, Rock Products has properly alleged that the Division
tortuously interfered with the Richards and Hadfield contracts.
The same arguments regarding the activities of Palmer
binding the Division set forth above with respect to prospective
economic relations apply to this cause of action.
POINT VI
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR
CIVIL REMEDY DUE TO THE STATE DEPENDANTS'
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
As stated in Point II above, Rock Products' allegation
that the Division and Palmer violated the Utah Constitution, art.
12, § 19 is sufficient in a notice-pleading jurisdiction such as
Utah to give the State adequate notice of the claim being made
against it. Rock Products has alleged that the Stctte violated
this Constitutional provision which reads as follows:
Every person in this State shall be free to
obtain employment whenever possible, and any
person, corporation, or agent, servant or
employee thereof, maliciously interfering or
hindering in any way, any person from
obtaining or enjoying employment already
40
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Products to obtain essential employment because of its inability
to obtain bonded work as a result of the acts of Palmer amounts
to the deprivation of a fundamental right that this
Constitutional provision sought to prevent.

Rock Products should

be allowed to pursue this claim.
It has long been recognized through judicial
interpretation that a constitutional provision can give rise to a
cause of action absent legislative creation or approval.

The

U.S. Supreme Court recognized this private right of action in
Bivens

v. Six

Unknown Fed.

Narcotics

Agents,

L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).

Bivens

43 U.S. 388, 29
determined that the

victim of a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights may recover
damages against the violator in Federal Court despite the absence
of any statute conferring such a remedy.
Davis

v. Passman,

In another case of

442 U.S. 228, 239-243, 60 L. Ed.2d 846, 99

S. Ct. 2264, 2274-2276 (1979), the Court stated that it is more
willing to imply a right of action from the Constitution than
from an Act of Congress.

Courts also often allow a civil remedy

simply based upon disciplinary and regulatory statutes, as in the
case of the Courts fashioning civil remedies in federal
securities violation cases.

See J.I.

426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964); S.E.C.

U.S. 453, 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969).

v.

Case Co. v. Borak,
National

Sees.,

377 U.S.

Inc.,

393

The violation by the Division
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(Emphasis
added.)
The State Legislature has also provided,

in I Ml .n I

lb

Ann. $ 68-1-4, that "when +he violation of a right admits both of
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™ini 11II MI iiiiiii.il
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pi D s e c u t e
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This statute supports Rock Products' argument

that, while a criminal remedy for violation of this statute has
been Leg i s I at i n I y i mpusu ii „ t,!i r> , • i \ mi I i o m e d y

n i 1 /^n t" ho

party is not merged with that criminal remedy and a separate
civil action exists.
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I" f ended

Finally, the Constitution states that it applies to any
person, corporation, servant, or employee; this would obviously
include a public servant such as Palmer and a governmental entity
such as the Division.
The Court should be particularly reluctant to uphold
the dismissal of this claim based upon the authority cited above,
Electrical

Constr.

& Maint.

Co.

supra,

in view of the novel

theory of recovery of this claim.
POINT VII
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM AGAINST LIN
AND PALMER FOR VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A plaintiff, suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had only to
make a short and plain statement of essential elements of his
claim in his complaint.

The complaint will survive dismissal

unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Batista
Conley

v. Rodriguez,
v.

Flemming,

Gibson,

702 F.2d 393, 397 (1st Cir., 1983), citing

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1982); Richardson

651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir., 1981).

v.

Indeed, in order to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the
complaint must only show that a deprivation of a right that is
secured by the constitution or laws of the United States.
v. Smith,

634 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir., 1981).
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i m m 1 mil Pnolk

rontractois

lid

he

deprived Rock Products of a property interest in violation of a
constitutionally protected right,

(R. 522-523•)

Under a motion to dismiss, the Court is obligated to
accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint.

The

presumption, in conjunction with the standard of review for
§ 1983 actions set forth above, establishes the legal sufficiency
of Rock Products' claims under § 1983.
Lin and Palmer's immunity claims are equally misplaced.
The United States Supreme Court has held that state officials may
be sued in their individual capacities, while acting in their
official capacities under § 1983. Hafer
116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct.

v. Melo,

502 U.S.

,

(1991).

As to Lin's and Palmer's claims of common-law immunity,
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73

L. Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court enunciated
an objective test for the determination of qualified immunity in
order to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the
resolution of many and substantial claims on summary judgment."
457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct„ at 2738.

Qualified immunity is not

properly an issue for a motion to dismiss.

In Harlow,

articulated the following standard:
Government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established
46

the Court

statutory or constitutional ri ghts of wh i ch a
r e a s o n a b 1 e p e r s o n wo 1 i ] d h a ve kn owi 1
4 57 U. S. at 81 7-1 8 (citations ai id f ooti lote omitted) .
Assun i ng a ] 1 facts favorable t o Rock P r o d u c t s , Li n and
Pa 1 met
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t:l: ie H a i: I :: v ' st: andar I set

f s r t h abo^ e
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As demonstrated by the fo-regoing arguments, the court
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of the far* that it was entered with preiudire without the
oppottunitv of Rock Product 1 ! tn rorrrct any technical
deficiencies a s would have been ptupei

Uo\ h h"<|in is

respectfully requests the Court to reverse the District Court's
ruder and deny I lie "if'atn D P bondant i;"" IMnl i m to D i s m i s s .
Respecttu 1 1 y submitted this I Ith day ut January, I'iyj,
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

DAVID L. ""BARCLAY
NATHAN R. HYDE
Attorneys for Rock i^bducts
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P. KEITH NELSON [A2391]
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a
Utah Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs,
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY
CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation
Defendants.
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah Corporation, also known as RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a division or
agency of the State of Utah, PETER T.
LIN, MARVIN L. WIDERBERG, W. JAMES
PALMER, LORNA M. ALDER, L. REED ALDER,
DOES I THROUGH AND INCLUDING XXX,
LAVONNE ANDERSON, ROBERT L. ANDERSON,
SAMUEL S. ARENTZ, III, TRUDIE C. ARENTZ,
FRANK D. BAGLEY, MARLENE L. BAGLEY,
CAMILLE BANKHEAD, J. KEITH BANKHEAD,
ARLEEN E. BECKSTROM, GORDON M. BECKSTROM,
BONNIE J. BEHR, ROLAND W. BEHR, STEPHEN
H. BENNETT, MARLENE C. BENNETT, CLARICE

AMENDED
THIRD-PARTY
COMPLAINT

Civil No. C87-2390

Judge David S. Young

•^ j

R. BOGGESS, ELDIN W. BOGGESS, REID L.
BOGGESS, ALAN M. BORG, PATRICIA G. BORG,
DOROTHY G. BOULTON, MARIE F. BRADSHAW,
RULON H. BRADSHAW, CONNIE P. BRINTON, W.
ROBERT BRINTON, DON N. BROUGH, VERDELLA
B. BROUGH, DEBRA BURCH, DEE P.
BUTTERFIELD, EDNA B. BUTTERFIELD, STEWART
L. CARLSON, CHERRILL J. CARLSON, PHYLLIS
R. CHILD, RALPH CHILD, GRANT M.
CHRISTENSEN, CORPORATION OF PRESIDING
BISHOP CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER
DAY SAINTS, CALVIN H. CLARK, GLORIA A.
CLARK, GRACE S. CLAYTON, LON G. CLAYTON,
MAVIS G.CLAYTON, RONALD K.CLIFFORD, WENDY
L. CLIFFORD, MARY E. CONDIE, ROBERT A.
CONDIE, DONALD V. COOK, NANCY L. S. COOK,
GERALD A.DAMRON, MAE JEAN P.DAMRON, KAYE
0. DEMERIS, PETE DEMERIS, DIAL BUILDERS,
INC., a Utah corporation, KELVIN J.DRAKE,
RUTH DRAKE and/or her Estate, BUD D. DUNN
BURNETTA P. DUNN, DOROTHY E. ECKER,
RAY ECKER, ORLAND N. EDDINS, MILTON L.
ELDREDGE, MIRIAM B.ELDREDGE, LILA E.EMERY
FLORA S. ERICKSON, FREDRICK D. ERICKSON,
HELEN M. ERICKSON, THOMAS H. ERICKSON,
PAULETTA D. EWAN, E. GREENWOOD FAMP,
CAROLYN R. FERICKS, FRANKLIN H. FERICKS,
ANN C. FORBUSH, JAY M. FORBUSH, MARY E.
FORBUSH, DAVID R. FREE, DAVID G. FREE,
DEANNA E.FREE, JONI L.FREE, SANDRA D.FUNK
JAY W. GALLI, MARY J. GALLI, GARY L. GEE,
MARVA GEE, BARBARA L. GLEASON, JOHN S.
GLEASON, JR., LOWELL C. GREER, PEARL G.
GREER, MILDRED V. GREER, PAUL A. GREER,
ROBERT C. GREER, DOROTHY B. HALE,
ELLSWORTH H. HALE, DIANE M. HANSEN, DREW
W. HANSEN, EVAN W. HANSEN, GENEVA B.
HANSEN, MERRILL G. HANSEN, GARY R. HANSON
DEANNE HANSON, FRANK HARADA, A. WESLEY
HARDY, RUTH B. HARDY, BLAKE E. HAWS,
MELISSA B. HAWS, MARIAN F. HAWS, JULIA R.
HEDMAN, GLEN L. HENSON, KATHRYN G. HENSON
CLARA HILTON, H. RAY HILTON, B. DEAN
HOGGAN, SHIRLEY L. HOGGAN, DIANE D.
HOLBROOK, DONALD HOLBROOK, LAUREL D.
HOLMES, WENDELL T. HOLMES, BERNIECE
HOPKINS, BRENDA M. HOWCROFT, HAROLD T.
HOWCROFT, KENNETH B. HOWCROFT, SHIRLEY D.
HOWCROFT, RAYMOND D., INGERSOL, WILMA D.
INGERSOL, KAREN ISRAELSEN, GLEN R.JACKSON
YVONNE JACKSON, MARGENE D. JACOBSON,
WALLACE V. JACOBSON, GLEN E. JESSOP, DALE
L.JEWKES, LUCILE T.JEWKES, J.DEAN JOHNSON
J.G.HENRY JOHNSON, JUNE H.JOHNSON, SHARON
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JOHNSON, RAY L. KENNEY, VONA D. KENNEY,
DAVID L. KEZERIAN, GAYLE, P. KEZERIAN,
BLANE T. KIMBALL, LA RENE G. KIMBALL,
RONALD W. KING, CLAUDIA L. KING, CHARLES
M. KOEHN, JOYCE E. KOEHN, VIOLET L.
KOEHN, WILLIAM KOEHN, OWEN C. LAMBERT,
VIRGINIA S. LAMBERT, GARY F. LARSEN,
SUZANNE W. LARSEN, DELORES N. LEWIS, GENE
A. LEWIS, CONSTANCE L. LIEBER, WILFORD K.
LIEBER, KEITH LOCKWOOD, WANDA R. LOCKWOOD
JOHN LOMBARDI, RUTH E. LOMBARDI, ALVIN R.
LUNDGREN, JOYCE LUNDGREN, GAIL J.
LUNDSKOG, PARLEY J. LUNDSKOG, BRUCE E.
MACKAY, GAIL MACKAY, CARLOS N. MADSEN,
MARGARET Y. MADSEN, CLEALON B. MANN,
NANELL H. MANN, SANDY L. MARTIN, GEORGE
M. MATTHEWS, PATSY MATTHEWS, FAYE D.
MCNEIL, RICHARD S. MCNEIL, JACQUELINE E.
MEISTER, JAN MEISTER, MAX L. MENLOVE,
NANCY L. MENLOVE, DARLEEN M. MERRIHEW,
JOHN E. MERRIHEW, M. PAUL MERTLICH, RUTH
E. MERTLICH, CAROL L. MEYER, ROBERT A.
MEYER, EMMA MOUNTEER, KENNETH E.
MOUNTEER, IRENE W. NICKLE, JAMES L.
NICKLE, and/or his Estate, NEAL NORMAN,
STEVEN R. OAKESON, DOUGLAS D. OLSEN,
SHARRON R. OLSEN, DONNA S. PACKER, EDSON
F. PACKER, SHARON B. PACKER, JIM PAPPAS,
CHERIE PARDOE, J. FRANK PARDOE, CHAUNCEY
E. PENFOLD, FLORENCE L. PENFOLD, KATHLEEN
C. PERRIN, YVES R. PERRIN, CLIFTON D.
PETERSON, THELMA W. PETERSON, DOROTHY M.
PIERCE, ERNEST PIERCE, VIRGINIA 0. RAY,
WILLIAM R. RAY, SANDRA REMINDER, DALE
RIDD, MARTA L. RIDD, JACQUELINE RIDDELL,
PAUL A. RIDDELL, VERA B. RITCHIE, GEORGE
G. ROBINSON, JOYCE ROBINSON, JOHN S.
RUTTER, PAULA A. RUTTER, HELEN SASS,
DELMA G. SAUNDERS, WAYNE E. SAUNDERS,
ELEANOR L. SAVAGE, J.R. SAVAGE, DUANE
SHAW, MARCHELLE M. SHAW, NATALIE SHAW,
JOYCE R. SHELL, HAZEL A. SMITH, EILEEN P.
STROUD, WALTER A. STROUD, GARY P.
SYMKOVIAK, NAOMI N. SYMKOVIAK, PAUL F.
SYMKOVIAK, DIXIE R. TAYLOR, GARY L.
TAYLOR, MARCENE F. TAYLOR, ROBERT E.
TAYLOR, ILENE D. TEA, MICHAEL H. TEA,
CHARLEE H. THOMPSON, WAYNE A. THOMPSON,
FRANK TRUNZO, SUSAN TRUNZO, CHRISTINE C.
TUELLER, RUSSELL E. TUELLER, HOWARD H.
TULLIS, JULIANNE TULLIS, MARNE W. TUTTLE,
CAROL A. TYCKSEN, CECIL A. TYCKSEN,
CHARLES VAN VALKENBURG, WAYNE VAN
VALKENBURG, HAROLD P. VORDOS, SUSAN M.
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VORDOS, GERALD C. WEBB, JOANN G. WEBB,
LINDA M. WEBB, SIEGFRIED A. WEISS, DONA
I. WEST, JOHN D. WEST, JOHN M. WEST,
MARLENE P. WEST, FERROL S. WHITMORE, REX
G. WHITMORE, ISABEL C. WIDERBERG, EUNICE
M. WILKINSON, ROBERT G. WILKINSON, JR.,
IRENE S. WRIGHT, OWEN H. WRIGHT, MARVIN
C. ZITTING, RHEA S. ZITTING
Third-Party Defendants.

Third-Party Plaintiff and Defendant under the within
Complaint, VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY (hereinafter
referred to as "Rock Products11) hereby complains and alleges
against the above-named Third-Party Defendants as follows:
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

VES A. KARREN is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah,

doing business under the name of ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY, with
its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., also known as RICHARDS

IRRIGATION CO. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"Richards") has heretofore filed a Complaint in the within
proceedings and has alleged therein that it is a Utah
corporation with its business being conducted in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
3.

PETER T. LIN (hereinafter sometimes referred to as

"Lin") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

MARVIN L. WIDERBERG (hereinafter sometimes referred to

as "Widerberg") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
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5.

W. JAMES PALMER (hereinafter sometimes referred to as

"Palmer") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

All of the remaining above-named individual

Third-Party Defendants with the exception of SAMUEL S. ARENTZ,
III, TRUDIE C. ARENTZ, CHAUNCEY F. PENFOLD, FLORENCE L.
PENFOLD, and HAZEL A. SMITH, are residents of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

DIAL BUILDERS, INC., is a Utah corporation

doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

THE

CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, also known as "CORPORATION OF
PRESIDING BISHOP CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS"
is a Utah corporation, doing business in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

RUTH DRAKE may be deceased, in which event the

defendant in this case shall be her estate.

JAMES L. NICKLE

may be deceased, in which event the defendant in this case
shall be his estate.
7.

SAMUEL S. ARENTZ, III AND TRUDIE C. ARENTZ are

residents of Reno, Nevada; CHAUNCEY F. PENFOLD and FLORENCE L.
PENFOLD are residents of Youngsville, Louisiana; and HAZEL A.
SMITH is a resident of Wendover, Utah.
8.

Other than a) the DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES FOR THE

STATE OF UTAH (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"Division"), b) Lin, and c) Palmer, all of the above-named
Third-Party Defendants, (hereinafter sometimes referred to
collectively as "Property Owners") own real property located in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and appointed Richards as
their duly authorized agent for the installation of the

below-described pressurized water irrigation system upon or
about the below-described "Properties."
9.

On or about the 23rd day of June, 1986, Richards

executed a contract (hereinafter referred to as "Richards
Contract") for the installation of a pressurized water
irrigation system (hereinafter referred to as the "System") on
or about the properties (hereinafter referred to as
"Properties") more particularly described in Exhibit "A" to a
mechanic's lien, entitled Notice of Lien, dated February 11,
1987, and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on February 12, 1987, as Entry or Reference No.
440113 0, which has heretofore been amended a) by a document
entitled Amendment to Notice of Lien dated February 20, 1987,
and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on February 20, 1987, as Entry or Reference No.
4405010, and b) by a document entitled Second Amendment to
Notice of Lien dated March 31, 1987, and recorded in the
official records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March
31, 1987, as Entry or Reference No. 4428303.

A true and

correct copy of the foregoing lien documents (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Lien") are attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference collectively as Exhibit "1."
To avoid repetitiveness, only Exhibit "A" to the Notice of
Lien, Exhibit "2" to the Amendment to Notice of Lien, and
Exhibits "AA" and "BB" to the Second Amendment to Notice of
Lien are attached as part of Exhibit "1".
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10.

At all times mentioned in this Amended Third-Party

Complaint, Lin and Palmer were acting as an employees,
agents and authorized representatives of the Division.

At

all times mentioned herein the Division was not performing a
governmental function, and the Division, Lin and Palmer were
acting in a purely ministerial capacity.

At all times

mentioned herein, Widerberg and Lin were acting as the agents
and authorized representatives of Richards.

On April 30, 1987,

Rock Products filed a notice with the Division and with the
Attorney General of the State of Utah as provided in Utah Code
Anno. Section 16-30-11 and Section 16-30-12 with respect to
those matters set forth below in the First Cause of Action,
Third Cause of Action, Fourth Cause of Action, Seventh Cause of
Action, Eighth Cause of Action, Ninth Cause of Action, Tenth
Cause of Action, Eleventh Cause of Action, Twelfth Cause of
Action, and Thirteenth Cause of Action.

However, Rock Products

stated in said notice that it did not consider the provision of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to apply to the claims set
forth below and was not waiving its right to assert that
position by virtue of filing such notice.
11.

In connection with the installation of the System, the

Division entered into a contract (hereinafter referred to as
"Division Contract") with Richards whereby the Division agreed,
among other things, as follows:
a.

To provide 85% of the funds necessary to pay the

purchase price of the System under the Richards Contract,
with Richards to reimburse the Division with interest

for such funds over time through water charges to its
shareholders;
b.

To design and provide a lay-out of the System, and

to prepare specifications, plans and bidding documents with
respect to the System;
c.

To provide the engineering for the System and

supervise construction thereof.
In contracting for and providing such services, the Division
became and acted in the capacity of the agent and duly
authorized representative of Richards.

Rock Products was a

third party beneficiary under the Division Contract by virtue
of becoming the successful bidder and contractor with respect
to the System.
12.

Certain specifications (hereinafter referred to as

"Specifications") prepared by the Division dated May of 1986,
constitute an integral part of the Richards Contract.

A copy

of said Richards Contract, including said Specifications, is
attached as an exhibit to Rock Products Answer and Counterclaim
on file in these proceedings.
13.

Pursuant to the terms of the Richards Contract, the

initial purchase price of the System was to be $351,612.00;
work commenced on the System on July 9, 1986, and continued,
with the System essentially, or substantially, completed as of
November 21, 1986, with the last finishing work performed by
Rock Products on or about December 23, 1986.
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14.

On June 6, 1986, a pre-bid conference (hereinafter

referred to as "Pre-Bid Conference") was conducted by Widerberg
and Lin.

On June 16, 1986, a pre-construction conference

(hereinafter referred to as "Pre-Construction Conference") was
also conducted by Lin and Widerberg.

At the conferences, Lin

and Widerberg described the bidding and construction
requirements and the general configuration, nature, lay-out,
quantities of material and needs of the System.
15.

During the period of July 9, 1986, through and includ-

ing November 21, 1986, the amount of said $351,612.00 was
increased by approximately $217,023.51 with respect to the
following items:
a.

$105,203.95 representing requested change orders

by Richards.
b.

$45,988.35 representing increases in the

quantities of materials necessary to install the System
above and beyond those set forth in the original
Specifications due to the understatement in the
Specifications of the quantities of materials needed to
install the System.
c.

$65,831.21 of additional costs due to changed

conditions from those set forth in the Specifications and
as disclosed to Rock Products by Lin and Widerberg at the
Pre-Bid Conference and due to misrepresentations of
conditions contained in the Specifications and made to Rock
Products at the Pre-Bid Conference.
Therefore, the total purchase price of the System under the
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Richards Contract was $568,635.51.

Richards and the Division

1) were aware of the foregoing change orders, increased
quantities, changed conditions and misrepresentation of
conditions, 2) consented and agreed to such change orders and
additional quantities, and 3) are bound and obligated by the
increased costs set forth in this paragraph 15.
16.

To date, Richards has paid Rock Products the sum of

$438,248.85, leaving an unpaid balance, exclusive of interest,
attorney's fees and costs, of $130,386.66.
17.

Section 14.7 of the Specifications provides that

interest shall be paid on any portion of the purchase price
under the Richards Contract that is retained.

The Richards

Contract contemplates that such interest shall be calculated at
a reasonable rate in accordance with prevailing interest rates
considering all circumstances, including the risks involved.
In accordance with the risks involved, 13.5% per annum is a
reasonable rate under the circumstances.

Rock Products is,

therefore, entitled to interest on said unpaid balance of the
Richards Contract in the amount of $7,912.19, through and
including April 30, 1987.

Rock Products is further entitled to

interest on said $130,386.66 unpaid balance at the rate of
13.5% per annum or $48.22 per day from April 30, 1986, until
such funds are fully paid.
18.

As a third-party beneficiary under the Division

Contract, Rock Products is entitled to payment of 85% of the
purchase price of the System under the Richards Contract, or
$483,340.18, which leaves a balance due and owing to Rock
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Products from the Division of $45,091.33.

In addition, Rock

Products is entitled to interest on said $45,091.3 3 from the
due date thereof until it is paid at the rate of 13.5% per
annum, together with 85% of the attorney's fees and costs due
Rock Products by Richards.
19.

Part of the increased costs over said $351,612.00

constitutes additional sand for bedding of the System.
Approximately two weeks after the commencement of construction
of the System, it became apparent to Rock Products (a) that the
nature of the soil in which the System was to be installed was
far rockier than was represented by Lin and Widerberg to Rock
Products at the Pre-Bidding Conference and at the
Pre-Construction Conference and than was implied in the
Specifications and (b) that the quantities of sand that would
be required for the System were significantly greater than the
quantities of sand represented to be necessary by Lin and
Widerberg at the Pre-Bid Conference and at the Pre-Construction
Conference and as implied in the Specifications upon which
bidding was based.

Representations were made by Lin and

Widerberg at said conferences that, for the most part, native
material could be used for backfilling without the necessity of
screening or processing.
20.

Pursuant to a meeting between a representative of Rock

Products, Lin and Widergerg held on or about July 23, 1986,
Rock Products objected to the misrepresentations as to the
condition of the soil and quantities of sand required.
Consequently, Lin and Widerberg agreed that the total quantity
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of the sand would be exceeded and that Richards would pay for
such additional quantities of sand.

Lin and Widerberg further

agreed that Rock Products could charge a unit price per cubic
yard associated with the installation of such additional sand
higher than the unit price contained in the bid in connection
with the installation of the original quantity of sand set
forth in the Specifications, so long as the higher unit price
associated with the installation of the additional sand was
reasonable considering relevant factors.

Such relevant factors

include, but are not necessarily limited to, the cost of the
sand itself, associated sand hauling charges, and costs
associated with hauling away native material removed from the
trenches.

Considering the factors involved, the unit price of

$8.25 per cubic yard for the additional sand is fair and
reasonable.

On August 12, 1986, it was further agreed by Lin

and Widerberg that an inspector to be provided by the Division
would sign, on a daily basis, for the quantities of sand
utilized in the bedding of the System.

This process was

thereafter followed by Rock Products until the Division
withdrew its inspector from the job.

Such withdrawal occurred

without the consent of Rock Products.
21.

Based upon the foregoing agreement regarding sand, an

additional 6,196 cubic yards of sand at an additional cost of
$51,117.00 was utilized beyond the quantities set forth in the
Specifications.
22.

On or about October 13, 1986, Widerberg approached

Rock Products and stated that, if Rock Products intended to
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claim additional charges due to the need for quantities of
asphalt beyond the quantities set forth in the Specifications,
Rock Products should cease work on the asphalt and that
Richards would take over the installation of asphalt with
respect to the System from that point forward.

On or about

October 17, 1986, Rock Products notified Richards of its intent
to file such a claim, and, thereafter, Richards undertook to
install all asphalt with respect to the System.

Such remaining

asphalt work represented approximately 10% to 15% of the total
asphalt work under the Richards Contract.
23.

The procedure for installing detectable tape in the

System under the Richards Contract was to install the same
concurrently with the installation of asphalt, in order that
the tape not be installed and later disturbed due to asphalting
excavation and related activities.

Therefore, Richards

undertook responsibility for installing the detectable tape
throughout the remainder of the System for which it assumed
asphalting responsibility.
24.

Despite repeated demands upon Richards to pay the

outstanding balance under the Richards Contract, it has failed
and refused to do so and has therefore materially breached its
obligations thereunder.

Pursuant to paragraph 15.3 of the

Specifications, upon any failure of Richards to make payment as
required under the Richards Contract, Rock Products has the
right to cease all work until payment for all amounts due is
paid.

Rock Products has offered to make any needed repairs or

corrections to the System for which it may have responsibility

-13-

under the Richards Contract if the purhcase price under the
Richards Contract is fully paid.
25.

Lin, Widerberg, and, consequently, the Division and

Richards were aware 1) that Rock Products had posted a bond
(hereinafter referred to as "Bond"), a copy of which is
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit
"3", with respect to the completion of the System and 2) that
Rock Products had contracted with numerous subcontractors and
materialmen for the supply of materials and labor with respect
to installation of the System.

Lin, Widerberg and,

consequently, the Division and Richards were further aware
that, in the event the full purchase price under the Richards
Contract was not promptly paid, Rock Products would not be able
to pay such subcontractors and materialmen who would, in turn,
make a claim against such bond.
26.

To date, various claims have been filed against the

Bond, including, but not necessarily limited to, a claim by
Monroe, Inc. in the approximate amount of $4,379.98, a claim by
W. R. White Co. in the approximate amount of $51,355.81, and a
claim by Rich L. Thomas dba Rich L. Thomas Asphalt Company in
the approximate amount of $25,805.53, with respect to work and
materials provided in the installation of the System.
27.

It was reasonably anticipated by Lin, Widerberg and,

consequently, by the Division and Richards that, in the event
the full purchase price of the Richards Contract was not
promptly paid, and such claims were made against the Bond, Rock
Products would lose its ability to be bonded until such matters

were resolved, which loss has eventually occurred.

As a

result, Rock Products has been precluded from participating in
bidding on bonded projects, and Rock Products has sustained
damages as a result thereof in an amount to be established in
accordance with proof to be presented at the time of trial, but
in no event less than $100,000.00.
28.

In addition, Rock Product's reputation in the

community and the business relationship with its subcontractors
and materialmen have been injured, and Rock Products has
sustained damages in regard thereto in an amount to be
established in accordance with proof to be presented at the
time of trial.
29.

At the Pre-Bid Conference, Widerberg represented that

Richards had the installation of the System "cleared" with Salt
Lake County and that, due to certain offset rights that
Richards had, the construction permit for installing the System
would be obtained at no cost to Richards or to the contractor
installing the System and, therefore, that the cost of a
construction permit need not be included in the bid or purchase
price under the Richards Contract.
30.

When the foregoing representation with respect to the

permit subsequently proved to be untrue, Rock Products paid
approximately $3,900.00 for the permit, but Richards now
refuses to pay for the same.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conspiracy and Scheme to Defraud)
(Lin and Widerberg)
31.

By way of its first Cause of Action, Rock Products

incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation
contained in paragraphs 1 through and including 3 0 above.
32.

Sometime in September of 1986, Widerberg, the

president of Richards, conspired with Lin, a representative
of the Division and agent of Richards, to defraud Rock
Products in the following manner:
a.

It was agreed between them that the inspector

provided by the Division would be removed from the job site
during the remaining period of construction under the
Richards Contract to deprive Rock Products of a
representative to sign for the remaining sand.
b.

It was further agreed that Rock Products should be

induced to install such sand, but that, after the
installation of such sand, the Division and Richards would
refuse to pay for the same claiming that they had no
obligation to do so because of a lack of signature on the
part of an inspector.
33.

In furtherance of that agreement, the inspector was

removed from the job, and Widerberg requested, on or about
October 10, 1986, by speed letter, that the sand be installed
by Rock Products.
34.

In reliance upon said letter and due to the

circumstances and pressures regarding completion of the System,
Rock Products installed approximately $34,000.00 worth of
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additional sand; had Rock Products been aware that Widerberg
and Lin had no intention of causing the Division and Richards
to pay for such sand, Rock Products would not have installed
the same.

Rock Products has not been paid for such

additional sand despite demand for payment having been made
upon Lin and Widerberg.
35.

It was the intention of Lin and Wideberg that Rock

Products be induced, through the circumstances and pressures
regarding completion of the System, and it was the intention of
Widerberg that Rock Products rely upon the representations
contained in said letter, to install the sand, but that Rock
Products not be paid for such sand.
36.

Rock Products has, therefore, been defrauded in the

amount of approximately $34,000.00, which sum has not yet been
paid, together with interest thereon at the rate of 13.5% per
annum from the due date thereof until the $34,000.00 is paid in
full.
37.

Because of such conspiracy and scheme to defraud, Rock

Products is entitled to punitive damages against Lin and
Widerberg in the amount of $100,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its First Cause of
Action as follows:
A.

For damages against Lin and Widerberg, and each of

them, in the amount of approximately $34,000.00, plus interest
thereon at the rate of 13.5% per annum as alleged above.
B.

For punitive damages against Lin and Widerberg, and

each of them, in the amount of $100,000.00.
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C.

For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

D.

For such other and further relief as the court shall

deem appropriate.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Misrepresentation)
(Widerberg)
38.

Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including 30 above.
39.

Widerberg made untrue representations to Rock Products

that Richards intended to pay for approximately $34,000.00
worth of additional sand with respect to the System to be
installed after inspectors were withdrawn from the System job
site in October of 1986.

Such representations were untrue and

were known by Widerberg to be untrue at the time they were made.
40.

In reliance upon such representations, Rock Products

installed approximately $34,000.00 worth of additional sand
with respect to installation of the System and Rock Products
has not been paid for the same despite demand for payment upon
Lin and Widerberg.
41.

Had Rock Products been aware that Widerberg had no

intention of Richards paying for such sand, Rock Products would
not have installed the additional sand.
42.

As a proximate cause of such misrepresentations, Rock

Products has sustained damages in the amount of approximatley
$34,000.00 for such additional sand, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 13.5% per annum from the due date
thereof until the entire $34,000.00 is paid in full.
-18-
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43.

As a result of such misrepresentations, Rock Products

is entitled to punitive damages against Widerberg in the amount
of $100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Second Cause of
Action as follows:
A.

For judgment against Widerberg in the amount of

approximately $34,000.00, together with interest thereon from
the date the same was due at the rate 13.5% per annum until the
same is fully paid.
B.

For judgment against Widerberg for punitive damages in

the amount of $100,000.
C.

For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

D.

For such other and further relief as to the court

shall deem appropriate.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Misrepresentation)
(Lin and Widerberg)
44.

Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including 3 0 above.
45.

Lin and Widerberg, and each of them, knew or should

have known that the soil conditions of the Properties were not
as represented in the Pre-Bid Conference, in the
Pre-Construction Conference, and in the Specifications, and Lin
and Widergerg were negligent in misrepresenting the same.
46.

Rock Products relied upon such representations in

entering into and performing work under the Richards Contract.
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47.

As a result of such misrepresentations, Rock Products

has incurred costs of approximately $116,000.00 that were not
anticipated under the original bid, and Rock Products is
entitled to payment for the same.
48.

Rock Products is entitled to interest thereon at the

rate of 13.5% per annum from the date of incurring such costs
until the same are fully paid.
49.

In addition, Widerberg knew or should have known that

Richards could not obtain the construction permit at no charge,
and Widerberg was negligent in representing that the permit
would be obtained at no charge.
50.

Rock Products relied upon such representations in

entering into and performing work under the Richards Contract.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Third Cause of
Action as follows:
A.

For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of

them, in the amount of $116,000.00, plus interest thereon as
alleged.
B.

For judgment against Widerberg in the amount of $3,900

for such permit, plus interest thereon at the rate of 13.5%
from the date of payment for the permit by Rock Products until
Rock Products is fully reimbursed for the $3,900.00.
C.

For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of

them, for additional damages of not less than $100,000.00 in
accordance with proof to be presented at the time of trial as a
result of Rock Products' inability to obtain bonding.
D.

For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of

-20-

3f -

. --.r

•.

-

.:=: .ess reputation and the

business relation: :•: So->. Products In accordance with proof to
be presented at the time of tria 1
E.

F o i: a t !
::: ::i) r n e y "' s £ e e s a i 1 d c c) s t s .

F.

For such other and further rel ief as the court shall

deem appropriate.
FOURTH CAUSE OF AC1!1 ION
(Conspiracy to Convert Property)
(Lin and Widerberg)
51 • R i)ck Pi: o Illc tis i ncorporates her e 1 n 1:::)y reference each
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including

above.

52.
paid, Rock Products

;; exclusive owner -t

*.

-t.i

System.
53,

Richards has assumed possession of said System .•

attempted In ut L I J m

tht- i^sf i-iii J • i |nu idin,".| water arid i, n

charging services to customers.
£4.

-.-i.rh actior

inter- t

the part

; <:,:-...,

depr:

Products .

-

- Richards constitutes an
'o (pi - nn a

. .

..,.- and benefit

jn, I .iwfu I I y
System,

Including the labor and materials contained therein, thereby
resulting
be

intentional and unlawful conversion of property

..
5 .

„

nducts.
:t . widerberg conspired with one another to cause

Richards to so unlawfu' / convert such property, and Lin
encouraged Widerberc
conversion.

•• "* a suipnl

ut: I"-" i cha i d s ,

I'

:ause si ich

In doing so f Lin and Widerberg acted with malice
-2] -

I uwa nJ bl JC k lJn mini ;!,'•.. .
56.

A s a result R o c k Products Is entitled to punitive

d a m a g e s against L i n and, Widerberg, a n d each of them, in t h e
J
r1

anr lint ct

ou , MI"? , on ecv:h.

W H E R E F O R E , R o c k Products prays as t o Its F o u r t h Cause of
A c 1 1 o n as £o11ows:
A.
them,

F:r iudgmer*
3ii

B.

*

—'

-

.

F r : —:erest

A p r i l 30,
C.

-

Widerb*'

•

:

386.66 t h r o u g h a n d including

. • ::e amount of $7,912,19,

T

h.f:) [ i oni A|JI i 1 "Hi , [ yH7 ,

- '.-• -

until sa-.: „.j

—

-

.-:-..,- paid at the rate o f $48,22 p e r

day.
D.

F o r d a m a g e s against I I n a n d W i d e r b e r g , a n d

II it'ni, dun i "i Ron 1 Pi: oduc t:s l i i labi 1 1 t/y to o b t a i n bonding .

- i

amount to be established in accordance w i t h proof to " *•
presented

•• t.ie time of trial, b u t In n o event less than

$100
E.

Jt

]udgment against

a n d W i d e r b e r g , a n d each

rtp

them, f o r damage t o t h e b u s i n e s s r e p u t a t i o n a n d b u s i n e s s
r e l a t i o n s of R o c k Products in the amount to b e established in
acco: i * *
F.

'

. .

• • t" iroe i \ f t n: i a !, .

--,':,

F o r p u n i t i v e damages against

. r. aid W i d e r b e r g , and

each :: - .• -. :r ~::ti amount .:- S:JQ
G.

F o r attorne

H.

I

.:

s lees ana cost.
?.r and furthpr reiier

isuitvfi this rirr inn
s the court S I M I !

deem a p p r o p r i a t e .

Ji *i

F I F T H

C A U S E

0 F

A C T I 0 N

(Breach of Contract)
(The Division)
57.

Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
i ncj ud ing 2M a hi v/e.
58.

Pursuant to the Di vision Contract, the Division had

the responsibility for, among other things, the engineering,
J

lay-out, iinul configuration
had d iiILI ! y I 11 Rock Pi: oduc
a.

,-^uem anu, ±u ui;

-

• •••-<.-:,

:

Properly investigate the soil conditions of the

System and properly represent the conditions of the soil
;

Proper^ :

the System along rights-of--ay

and timely obtain clearance of rights-of-way.
<

Maintain v

:

*

inspector

-

r a**

. . times to

•

• .

was

properly performed with respect to the System.
Rock Products is a third-party beneficiary under the Division
Contract,.
59.

"The Division breached its duty to Rock Products as

follows
c

failed * properly investigate ' • *

co* *
of z

*
, .

.

'.•

*
aspects c: * .-* project

1 J t 11urns
-\ *• ,ng the

System.

01

b.

It" J a t J nd to properly lay out the System along

rights-of-way and failed to timely obtain clearance of
rights-of-way.
- *

sign - r ^-:;

-jrLain

-in

i j i s p e i i t, r

MINI

the

iot

to

-i - required and make certain that work was

properly performed, with respect to installation o*. cue
System.
60.

As a direct and proximate result of such breach, Rock

Products incurred the additional costs and expenses alleged
above.
WHEPEFORE, Ruck Products prays as to its Fifth Cause of
Action as fo11owsi
A.
^I in 1Hh
B.

For judgment against the Division in the amount of
iI

11 il 11

i 111 e I t>b 1 ci ii I I ei|*-fJ

11 H J v t - ; ,

For judgment against the Division for damages, due to

Rock Products 1 inability tc obtain bondinc

amount to be

established

?dl a t t I! i

C.

accordance wit

For judgment against the Division for damage to the

business reputation and business relations of Rock Products
fju» .^mivini

tii h n Pi.'tabJ

IHIICLI

IN

ai/cui d i nc* 1 dii.h p r o o t

to be

presented . i t the 11 me o f 11* i a ] .
D.

For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

E.

For such other and further relief is the* VIMI* GhalL

deem appi; upi idt.e.

-24-

:A

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Fund)
(The Division)
61.

R o c k P r o d u c t s i n c o r p o r a t e s h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e

and every al l e g a t i o n c o n t a i n e d in p a r a g r a p h s

each

L through and

I n c 1 u d i n g 3 0 a b o v e.

62.

Due to such failure to pay said 85% -f '' -

urchase

price ..;' the Richards contract, * ru:- Division ;s indebted to
>

" "

:•

thereon

' • I li'i I

,

lit

t

alleged , paragraph

•

; a s t

.,.

-i -

WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays ^

3 .t..> Sixth Cause of

Acti
for

A.

judgment against the Division in the amount of

$45,091.33, plus interest as alleged above.
B.

For attorney's fees and costs

C.

I 1 111

,:, i j i; 11 i -11 11 e i ri r 11II I n j; 1 1 1 e i

ursuing this action.
t

>

f. J i h

c u 111 I

s 11 a 1 1

deem appropriate.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Interference With Prospective Econom I c Relations)
(Palmer)
Rock Products incorporates herein hy reference each

6 3•
e '

.

including
64.

i

I i hi t utj'i|h

rind

above.
On __ .... :; .- November . .

Products
Rock Products resolve

Palmer wrote a letter
Bergener requesting that

- disputes

.ay have wi th Richards

and that, until such disputes were settled, Rock Products was
"removed from our pre-qualified potential contractor list." As
-25-

a result, Rock Products h a s been since barred from b i d d i n g

^

any work to be perforined f o r or in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e : /ision.
h":i ,

,liucn ,1 er„iiei" .11ini,I, siJ("I'in r»ii'11n11

interferred

with

Rock

Products'

* * \ . .

i o t n i a ii y d m

existing

and pot

*

. --*• r ~ : c

r e l a t i o n s in being able to bid upon and obtain centra*:" t
sueh worl

hheiehy earn mi] i m u r y to Rock 1'roduc^?

to Le pi nven 'it the ( HUH* ut I i ot 1 , bull

~

«r ^ n t

ill mi ewe

$100,000,00.
hh

Such conduct w a s employed for the purpose of forcing a

i. esu i ut i i mi i 111 i
n 111 .split e L>*- I

a I" e pa r •: i es r -it he i t II i n 11

furthering any legitimate governmental goa.1 o r p u r p o s e , and,
therefore
in1

was instituted f o r a n improper p u r p o s e .
In writinq such letter and u n d e r t a k i n g such 3 - . • • -

lJ a l i n e r a c 1.e 1J w 1 1 II1 ni n 1 J1 H I 11 1111 e r 11.11, JIII «111.1 y
injury upon Rock Products tu roerce Rock rroduct, •. * -• :

~^~

a settlement which was neither *»j its advantage ;._^ .ti.rantid,

.ere: ,;amou;1
t

, .,debted to Rock Products \n the

Palme:

the damages • illeged in paragraph 6 5 above,
i

:-*•"• «=• *

- -

amaaes

«,' imou' >i of $100, r ri n 0 0 .
. I i, 1 111 1 ! ,1 e v e n t h 1 ,„" n 11 s r o f

-:;.-.A c t i o n a s foi,:-

to
the

h

I1

LH,

e,i 1 1

t iTTie r

M.
$ I 0 in ,„

• judgment

a g a ; ; -*. ?*;??**-

fc

:

the
-

amount

iamages
:

-"f ~i* t*-d a t

-.

IKor p u n i t i v e damages against Palmer in the amount of
1 in.

-2 6-

C.

For attorney's fees and costs In bringing this action.

D.

inr -Mil I

' .:er and further relief as the Court shall

deer, app: cpr lat e ,
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Interference With Prospective Economic Relations)
(Division)
69.

Rock Products Incorporates herein by reference each

iinl f>"ei • UJi?«]il I in " • rit u n m l
including
m
' i

in | . i r i q r \ * p h i

iin o r a b o u t Novembe-

,

'"

~; . '

s i n c e been b a r r e d

i i st

>

until

"iijrh

relations

n m i" unit,

*

:^ ;h
Bryan

were

pre-qualified

i "ink P r o d u c t i h-iu

letter

Division,

. m l such a c t i o n

. a c t u a l l y anil

potentially

in I (jnturit i a I FM oniumLn

thereby causing

injury

t o Rock P r o d u c t s

I P PI; (• lb ] j s h e | IN l e c o r d a n n p wiHi n r o o f

t h e t i m e of; t r i a l ,

In*

Such c o n d u c t

resolution

in ^

i.^'upi

11

b

in nn amuunt

of a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n p r i v a t e p a r t i e s

for' an i m p r o p e r

-27-

at

U M > ;I i m , li i m

was employed f u r t h e p u r p o s e of

was i n s t i t u t e d

for

t o be p r e s e n t e d

1 a. Miei J i< i .in ,( ir-tpt hfnatiu «) ivpffirai'ii'i I qu > '
therefore

w

in b e i n g a b l e fn liid upon and o b t a i n c o n t r a c t s

such work,

"\" ,

**

such d i s p u t e s

i n t e i Lei i uui W I li lli lh n k innnlin f -i' ex i »1 i ncj

t

"

from b i d d i n g un .iiiy wui k I i hv p e i t o r n i n i i I

in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e
Ml

^r?

Rock P r o d u c t s was "removed from o u r

|.i t e n t i tin i on! i n i m

or

\ .

i eqm-.-st j up l.li J I l«

may h a v e w i t h (Richards and t u a t ,
settled,

and

30 a b o v e .

Pa I rn e r , w ? •n t e a I P. f t e r t o F ock Prodi: - *
Fiercjenet

1 thiouqh

forcing a

rather

"i f.\ir\

purpose,

than

i>se and

73,

In w r i t i n g s u c h l e t t e r a n d u n d e r t a k i n g

such

activity,

t f1P n T y T [S ] un ( t h rouqh Pa lmnr , acted w l th ma 1 ice t o
i n t e n 1 1 o r i t;i J. 1 y i n t 1. i \' t' e i 1i111» J 1111: m 11 | n 11 , 1111 R111 *. k
c o e r c e R o c k P r o d u c t s to entet

P r n 11 u c* t J:, I 11

into a s e t t l e m e n t w h i c h was

n e i t h e r t;n its a d v a n t a g e not: w a r r a n t e d a n d , t h e r e f o r e ,
i Mjist.jtul M.B iinpiupei
"'4.

n iiin;iiin",t»,
is

Therefore, the Division

indebted

in t h e a m o u n t »)): t h e d a m a g e s a l l e g e d
t oget her w i tlh | n m i 11 ve d a m a q e s
1 K

I IT a t

Uie

UlVlsioi'i

Mi

exercise of any governmental

SU

to Rock

in p a r a g r a p h

i n t hp. amount
rt"

I J'n.J

Wrt!

11

Products

7 1 above,
of $500 , rnif) , Oh ,

MlV'J J V':" I

I "I

Ml1

function.

W H E R E F O R E , R o c k P r o d u c t p r a y s a s t o i t s E i g h t h C a u s e of

r j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e Div i s i o n in t h e amount
d a m a g e s tc pre*-*--

-" -; lished in a c c o r d a n c e wi th p r o o f t o b e

a t t h e t x m e of t r i a l , b u t in n o e v e n t l e s s t h a n

$. .

For punitive damages against the Division i n the
a m o v^n L O f $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 .
C.

(''""•'Hi' ifi I" t; urne^, ' "•« f e e s

cifin.l cii'-it •., i n

ill/'or s u c h o t h e r and f u r t h e r

bringing

t;h:i s

action.

relief"' a s t h e Coin: t; iihlb.-t I I

deem app r ;p r I a t e ,
N I N T H C A U S E OF A C T I O N
(T'ot t j i,;ii,:. 1 lit erfe^-r.'e w i t h ;. '--"irMj.il

Pe 1 at 11 *i:M

Palmer
nh

! ixi;

and every

alle--*. .

including

3 0 above•

-*

:ontained

• - i nil i ly

in p a : a g r a p h s

-28-

r e f err? ni np »j"i" h

I through ami

n

7.

Cn or about N o v e m b e r 14, 198f, P a l m e r w r o t e g letter

ick Products in care of M r , Bryan Bergener requesting
hoik i-iuiuctn Misnl"i» HIT/ d I sf nt * n it niay have wi t h
R i c h a r d s and that, until such disputes were settled

i-« irr

Products w a s "removed from our pre-guii 1 if ied potential
\ lis 1 "

\:ntract,c

n , ri result, RocF rrodu "t:s h a s since been

barred from biddjnq on dii/ <«i il l i In | ei 1 k nued lor mi in
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e Division
78,

li'ni writing suen letter and undertaking such activity;

Palmer ac'led w 11 li ma I i r i I

m nl L nt i HI i J i jf i nf I i nf ei on 'in i

injury on Rock Products to coerce Rock Products t.u entci

uit.o a

settlement which w a s neither to its advantage noi warranted.
'

i'i .

,tl cut L L ^ J. < 'J,1 of Dficembfi*, 1 9 " ^ Hadfield

Irrigation Company w a s successiui

in nia j in i ny i lie I nil null

contract work it Install a 1^ Inch pressure irrigation line at
Henifer„
'in

Utah
I ut .jU.iiit hi tinqui i JI I inns IhH ween Hock Products and

Hadiield, Hidfield indicated that J I; wishei Rock Prudu:U- to
u n d e r t a k e a portion of the construction of sucti line at a total
contract n r u p tn Pnnk Productr of approximately $5?,nnn nn
i

in I" i Nil \M • i , Hcnil j *;» 111 inn,) ihfnmicj by Cirtry

*ic\.\h.\ ,

emp1oyee o f the D I v i s i on r tiI at he had been inf orTOed b) Pa Imer
teat no work wa^ *

; e subcontracted to Rock Products by
.

j---

Products ,,.. * . r, * .
-:
c

: z.\:tf

i therefore refused to utilize Rock
ect.
on behal f of the Palmer, therefore,

K rxoducts of its right to contract with

-29-

!i"i

H a d f i e l d in r e g a r d t o such wnrTc irid t o r t i o u s l y

interferred

with Rock Produces" contractual relations with Hadfield.
l

« JI i. . ,* PI* l ^ t ern.v

83.

* * i by " <pp! >per «pear r:, for "<n

improper purpose, and caused injury to R O C K Products mi n m
amount of approximately $5,!, n00, 00,
i it-- i11 i/ iu ii .rondurf

•i

, |^ Products is entitled

*-~ recover said damages, jjlui jniten 1 ! thei^on

11 the ! Hi- il

10% per annum iron the date the $52,000,00 would have Leen paid
by HddfiuiJ until cue same is fully p.iid tn Rock Product--,
f ogether w i ! h | nn j I i >H danianns Hiffii i nsl Pa 1 mi?r >

!"

amoun*

- •'

$ion,ooo,no,
WHEREFORE, Rock Product prays as to its Ninth Cause of
An t K m i • 1 11 1 'vi:
A

} or judgment against Palmet

i n t:ln aniL Jim

il" daiimges

to be established in accordance with proof to be presented at
the tim

T

t r i a l , b u t in no event less t h a n $ 5 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , p l u s

inter, es
P

"

-4

*

damages a ^ a . ; r

Palmur in t h e .1111 Mini

I

$10 0 , " ^
I

,'i I- f oi"ney ' s f e e s and c o s t «"•; i n b r I ng i ng t h i s

11.

: o r s u c h o t h e r rind Lai Ihei,

action.

.• I i e 1" a„;,i tho Coin, t: sha I I

deem appropriate,
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(T ortious Inter ferein le with Contractual Relations)
(Division)
nrporates herein by reference each
and e v e r y a . ^./
including

. , r • .

in e a 111 \ \ a 1 a q 1 a fi 111 ,s 1 t 1 n r 11 u 1 ^ 111 . 11 111:11
paragraphs
- 3 0-

<?"7 t h r o u g h a n d

including 83 above,
86.

In engaging In such conduct, Palmer and Cooper were

a c 11 n q o n n e n a i t n r f n n In v i s i i) r i, v i u I ' 1 I 1 • in f" I' i R i r
personal capacities, and the Division

is, i: n ere. tore,

Liable

for such damages as alleged in paragraph 83 above, plus
interest tlherenn vt the r-itp of 10"! por annum from the rlrite

11Ltvt.j 11a Ii.1 a.i 111 ;J" <(, 11nini 1111 11111 i I I 111» tnimti

H a d f ,ie 1 el 'w u 111

i s

fully paid to Rock Products, together with punitive damaqes in
the amount of $500, C*
WHERFFORF, Rnck
Action as

fir a y s

is I n if •• !Y;nl Hi C n.i<si- nf

fo1Lows:

A

l« o r j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t

damaqes hi bo e s t a b l i s h e d
presentcil

\\

$ 5 2 , 0 0 0 . tin

t In

I inn

plus

the Division

in t h e amount

in n c c o r c l a n r e w i t h p r o o f

nil I i i il

bull

interest; thereon as

iiii nu i > mil

t o hp

l o s s tllinii

alleged.

t i v e damages a g a i n s t t h e D i v i s i o n i n

i

, .* -c

"or s u e

.:•**'

'*°es and cost,,, in I r i n g i n g
i~J

further

of

relief

the

this

as t h e Court

action.
shall

deem a p p r o p r i a t e .
ELEVENTH CAUSE Ob ACTION
(Injunctive
- and • "-•
include

Relief

includin •

Palmer)

Uroducts i n c o r p o r a t e s h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e

legation contained
.

- D i v i s i o n and

in p a r ' g r a p h s

iijvtj tilliJ in p a r a g r a p h s
above.

-31-

each

1 t h r o u g h ai id

ni thinnugli

iiiu.l

88.

Such conduct has and will result in permanent and

.Irreparable harm 'to

Products by i rreparably damaging

ROK:!';

its relations with contract.or s and supip 1 ler s ,
„ daniacj .11 iq Hoi • Ik;
Products reputation In the community, and irreparably causing
damage I I "he business of Rock. Products,

89 .

> i. i k 1:" it. i.. 11 i 111.: I s i. '• 1

1 11 e r e f o r e

i | e i • m a r i e n t,

i •». n 1 1 1 ' 1. e d I

injunction against the Division, Palmer, and Its personnel to
cease and desist from such interference and prohibition of Rock
P r o d i i c t "!| "',i'« r i ">]!i 1 f o lb i ell nipt m iim.'l pa r t u i p a t i-» i ni ID i v i s i on

ml ated

proj e c t s

WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays a s to I ts Eleventh Cause of
Action as follows:

A.

I? :::)i: 1 [ 11« n u . i 11 e 111

111 111 n t f I o 11 \ \ \ \ 111 s I I II11 111 v i s 11 11,

against Palmer and against all other appropriate personnel of
the Divisj on to cease and desist from such Interference and
pi: oh i b i t i c n

B.

I 'or attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

C

For such other and further relief as the Court shall

deem appropriate.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Good Faith Di i tyj
(Division.)
Qn

and -vc*
i"

.i1

°-

**

*. . ec.v: i
v

incorporates herein by raterence

each

on tained i n paragraphs 1 through and

r >ha in paragraphs 51 through and

inc„
'he Div:s; ^ has an ob] igation and duty to ict

A

.~ ~~~^

fairh *A w.Ac pcriormance of the Division Contract,
-3 2"; i

92.

The Division has breached its duty of good faith wi th

respect to the Division Contract by engaging

in the above

al 1 eged

-

-

duty of good faith In thdt „ alter commencement

*

I iiipropei cunducl

The I'vjv i "iinin tin

* s
- .

installation of the System, Lin and Widerberg requests:
save timn

thir

than Richards
request,

Products

i n 11 int i u<j Ilium

-mid W i d e r b e r g ,

of t h e D i v i s i o n ,
orders

x wcv

Uui k l i u d u

on b e h a l f

of

R i c h a r d s ami Lin on b e h a l f

h

rharige

I I n M u c i ' s I»ei nine I J nhai tin ill nil mil

("heir

71,

Therefore,

Rock P r o d u c t s

is e n t i t l e d t o recover

o n l y t h e damages an a l l e g e d

above,

a g a i list

inn inn I i Ul

I In- Hi
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damacres to be

E.

For damage to its business reputation in an amount to

be established in accordance with proof to be presented at the
time of trial.
F.

For punitive damages against the Division in the

amount of $500,000.00.
G.

For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

H.

For such other and further relief as the Court shall

deem appropriate.
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of State Constitutional Rights
Guaranteed Under Article 12, Section 19 of
Utah Constitution)
(The Division and Palmer)
94.

Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including 37 and in paragraphs 51 through and including 89
above.
95.

Article 12, Section 19 of the Utah Constitution

states:
Every person in this State shall be free to obtain
employment whenever possible, and any person,
corporation, or agent, servant or employer thereof,
maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, any
person from obtaining or enjoying employment already
obtained, from any other corporation or person, shall
be deemed guilty of a crime. The Legislature shall
provide by law for the enforcement of this section.
The purpose of the aforementioned provision of the Utah
Constitution was to prohibit the exact interference with
contractual relations by the Division and Palmer as set forth
above.
96. A private right of action against the Division and
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Palmer, separate from any claim for tortious interference,
exists in favor of Rock Products, rendering Palmer and the
Division liable for the damages set forth above, together
with punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00 against
Palmer and $500,000.00 against the Division.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Thirteenth Cause
of Action as follows:
A.

For judgment against the Division for damages to be

established in accordance with proof to be presented at the
time of trial, but in no event less than $100,000.00 for damage
to the business reputation and business relations of Rock
Products in an amount to be established in accordance with
proof to be presented at the time of trial.
B.

For punitive damages against Palmer in the amount of

$100,000.00 and against the Division in the amount of
$500,000.00.
C.

For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action.

D.

For such other and further relief as the Court shall

deem appropriate.
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure)
97.

Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each

and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including 3 0 above.
98.

Said mechanic's Lien was filed pursuant to authority

under Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-1 and sequential.
99.

As set forth in said Lien, Rock Products claims a
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mechanic's lien in the amount and with respect to the
Properties owned by the Property Owners as is more particularly
set forth in said Lien.
100. Notices of said Lien, including amendments, were sent
to the reputed owners or record owners of the Properties via
certified mail within thirty (30) days after filing of the
notice of said lien and within thirty (30) days after filing
any amendments thereto.
101. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-15,
Rock Products is entitled to a decree from this Court causing
the Properties to be sold in satisfaction of the Lien and to
pay costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages subject to
the right of redemption and, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 38-1-16, Rock Products is entitled to obtain a
deficiency judgment against the Property Owners in the amount
of the sums due and owing to Rock Products not paid and
satisfied pursuant to such sale.

Rock Products is therefore

entitled to recover all of its attorney's fees and costs in
pursuing this action.
102. Does I through and including XXX claim some right,
title or interest in and to all or some of the Properties;
however any such right, title or interest is subordinate and
inferior to the Lien rights of Rock Products in and to the
Properties.

The identity, address, and nature of claimed

right, title or interest, of Does I through and including XXX
are presently unknown to Rock Products, and Rock Products
reserves the right to amend this Amended Third-Party Complaint
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if and when such information is obtained by Rock Products.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Fourteenth Cause
of Action as follows:
A.

For judgment against the Property Owners for all

outstanding indebtedness under the Richards Contract, including
costs, attorney's fees and interest.
B.

That the Properties be sold, free and clear of all

rights, titles and interests of the third-party defendants,
under the direction of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
pursuant to a decree of foreclosure entered by this Court, with
the proceeds to be applied to the outstanding balance under the
Richards Contract and with Rock Products being granted a
judgment against the Property Owners for any deficiency which
may remain.
C.

That Rock Products or any other party to this action

may become a purchaser of said Properties at sheriff's sale;
that the sheriff issue a certificate of sale of the purchase of
said Properties and that the sheriff issue his deeds to the
purchaser or purchasers thereof conveying said Properties; that
a writ of possession be issued by the Clerk of this Court upon
presentation of such sheriff's deed without further order of
this Court.
D.

That all the foregoing be done in accordance with the

laws of the State of Utah regarding the foreclosure of
mechanic's liens and, consequently, the foreclosure of
mortgages.
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E.

For such other and further relief as the Court shall

deem appropriate.
FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Civil Action for Violation of
Constitutionally Protected Rights)
(Lin and Palmer)
103. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and
including 37 above and in paragraphs 51 through and including
89 above.
104. At all times mentioned above, Lin and Palmer were
acting under color of Utah State law.
105. As alleged above, Lin and Palmer were acting as
employees, agents and representatives of the Division at all
times mentioned above.
106. In intentionally entering into a scheme and conspiracy
to defraud Rock Products of said $34,000 worth of funds
associated with the installation of sand after the withdrawal
of the inspector, Lin 1) acted with malice and/or intentional
indifference and/or with reckless disregard of the
constitutional rights of Rock Products as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
2) deprived Rock Products of a property interest without due
process of law in violation of that provision, and 3) is liable
to Rock Products pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for
damages it has sustained due to such violations.
107. By engaging in the conduct to exclude Rock Products
from the Division's pre-qualified contractors list, which
-38-

amounted to "black balling" Rock Products from participating in
Division related contracts and bidding, including, but not
limited to, the Hadfield Project, Palmer did, with gross
negligence and/or wanton negligence and/or reckless disregard
of the constitutional rights of Rock Products as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, violate that constitutional provision:
a.

By depriving Rock Products of its property rights

with respect to such contracts and economic gain without
due process of law; and
b.

By unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminating

against Rock Products in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consequently, Palmer is liable to Rock Products pursuant to
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for the damages it has sustained due
to such violation.
108. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, Rock Products is
entitled to recover, in addition to the damages it has
sustained as a result of the foregoing conduct on the part of
Lin and Palmer, all reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred in pursuing this action.
109. As a result of such conduct by Lin, Rock Products has
sustained damages in the amount of $34,000.00, plus interest as
alleged above.
110. As a result of such conduct by Palmer, Rock Products
has incurred direct and proximate damages in accordance with
proof to be presented at the time of trial, but in no event
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less than $152,000.00.
111. In addition, Rock Products is entitled to punitive
damages against Lin and Palmer, and each of them, due to such
Oconstitutional violation in the amount of $100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Fifteenth Cause of
Action as follows:
A.

For judgment against Lin in the amount of $34,000.00,

plus interest as alleged above.
B.

For judgment against Palmer in the amount of damages

to be established in accordance with proof to be presented at
the time of trial, but in no event to be less than $152,000.00,
together with interest thereon as alleged above.
B.

For punitive damages against Lin in the amount of

$100,000.00
C

For punitive damages against Palmer in the amount of

$100,000.00.
D.

For attorney's fees and costs in bringing this action.

E.

For such other and further relief as the Court shall

deem appropriate.
Dated this

S

day of August, 1987.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

BY (K ^XJXk

7)j(jL^

P. KEITH NELSON
Attorneys for Third-Party
Plaintiff, VES A. KARREN
dba ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of August, 1987,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
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be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
James E. Morton, Esq.
Hatch, Morton & Skeen
3450 Highland Drive, #150
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

AM/THIRD/ROCK
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MAR 2 1 ^
DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669
Solicitor General
R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE, No. 752
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone; (801) 538-7227
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
v.
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORP.,
Defendants.

VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO.,
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES,
PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER,
et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No. C87-2390
Judge David S. Young

On January 25, 1988, pursuant to notice, the Court conducted
a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed in this case by ThirdParty Defendants Utah Division of Water Resources, W. James Palmer, and Peter T. Lin ("State Defendants").
1.

Having carefully considered the pleadings, the memoranda

and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds and holds that as a
matter of law Rock Products1 Amended Third-Party Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the
State Defendants.
2.

The Court concludes that the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq. (U.C.A. 1953), bars every aspect of
Rock Products1 Amended Third-Party Complaint against the State
Defendants.

The State Defendants1 involvement in this case con-

stituted a governmental function, and there has been no relevant,
applicable waiver of immunity that would permit Rock Products to
maintain a cause of action against the State Defendants. Rock
Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint also fails to state a
claim for reasons of law independent of sovereign immunity.
3.

Rock Products has no contract with the State and is not

the intended beneficiary of a State contract, and therefore cannot maintain its contract claims. Also, since the State Defendants have no contractual obligation toward Rock Products, the
Section 63-30-5 waiver of immunity for contracts does not apply,
and Rock Products' contract claims are barred.

4.

Rock Products' tort claims do not state a cause of ac-

tion, and are also barred by immunity.

Sections 63-30-3; 63-30-

4; and 63-30-10.
5.

Rock Products' constitutional and statutory and civil

rights claims fail because of sovereign immunity; and because
Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because, on the
alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under the State
or federal statutes or the Utah Constitution or the United States
Constitution.
6.

As to the fifteenth cause of action, Rock Products has

failed to comply with the notice requirements of Sections 63-3011 and -12. The statutory time for compliance and for filing
additional claims has now expired.
7.

Rock Products has failed to comply with the bond require-

ment of Section 63-30-19.
Having concluded as a matter of law that Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint does not and cannot state a cause of
action against the State Defendants, and because Rock Products'
claims are barred by sovereign immunity,
THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS:
The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted.
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
Judgment is hereby entered against Third-Party Plaintiff Rock
Products and in favor of Third-Party Defendants Utah Division of
Water Resources, W. James Palmer, and Peter T. Lin (the State
Defendants).
•s5
DATED this JJ-^day

of/Pj^&f^,

1988.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. Y0UNGI
D i s t r i c t / C o u r l Judge

By

QL-PGJL
C«*v^V Ci&k

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT were served by mailing the same,
first class postage prepaid, this ^ f V d a y of March, 1988, to:
P. Keith Nelson
David L. Barclay
Gary L. Johnson
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs Karren
and Rock Products
50 South Main Street, #700
P.O. Box 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110

^AS CREDILLE
Assistant Attorney General
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 19. [Blacklisting forbidden.!
Every person in this State shall be free to obtain
employment whenever possible, and any person, corporation, or agent, servant or employee thereof, maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, any person from obtaining or enjoying employment already
obtained, from any other corporation or person, shall
be deemed guilty of a crime. The Legislature shall
provide by law for the enforcement of this section.
1896
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Section 1983 providt

follows:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
42 USC § 1983

ADDENDUM F

55

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities
from suit
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities
are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
1985

63-30-4

Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability Effect of waiver of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of
employee - Limitations on personal liability.
(4)

63-30-5

An employee may be joined in an action against a
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which the governmental
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or
under color of authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.

Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-3011, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.

63-30-10

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission
of employee - Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by violation
offourth amendment rights.
(1)

63-30-11.

Immunity from suit oj all governmental entities is waived jor
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment except if
the injury:
(a)

arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary junction, whether
or not the discretion is abused; or

(b)

arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass,
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or

(d)

arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by
reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection
of any property; or

(f)

arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee
whether or not it is negligent or intemional; or . . .

Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability.
(1)

A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person
commences to run.
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68-3-3

Retroactive effect.
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.
***

68-3-4

Civil and criminal remedies not merged.
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal
remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other.
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34-24-1

Blacklisting of employees prohibited.
No person shall blacklist or publish, or cause to be published or
blacklisted, any employee discharged or voluntarily leaving the
service of any person, company or corporation with intent and for
the purpose of preventing such employee from engaging in or
securing similar or other employment from any other person,
company or corporation.
***

34-24-2

Violation - Penalty.
If any person blacklists or publishes, or causes to be blacklisted or
published, any employee discharged by any corporation, company
or individual, with the intent and for the purpose ofpreventing such
employee from engaging in or securing similar or other employment
from any other corporation, company or individual, or shall in any
manner conspire or contrive by correspondence or otherwise to
prevent such discharged employee from securing employment, such
person is guilty of a felon and shall be fined not less than $55 nor
more than $1000 and imprisoned in the state prison not less than
sixty days nor more than one year.

